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This thesis presents three papers in macro labor theory. All of them share the particular
approach to the theory of unemployment pioneered by Dale Mortensen and Chris Pissarides.
In these models unemployment is frictional, and emerges as an equilibrium outcome in
an economy where workers and ￿rms are value-maximizing agents trading labor services.
To date, the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model has become the standard
framework for the macroeconomic analysis of labor markets. The heart of its success lies in
its ability to o⁄er an appealing description of the functioning of the labor markets together
with analytical ￿ exibility. In my thesis I exploit these virtues of the canonical framework in
order to study di⁄erent topics of interest in the macro labor literature.
The ￿rst two chapters of the thesis build on the theoretical literature on labor market
institutions and macroeconomic performance. Typically, this literature has investigated the
role of institutions such as minimum wages, unemployment bene￿ts, employment protection
or centralization in wage bargaining. In my thesis I rather focus on all the institutions which
a⁄ect the equilibrium of the labor market by hindering screening procedures. Mainly, I
think about limitations on the use of temporary contracts and probationary periods, which
are extensively used by ￿rms to screen workers on-the-job. In addition, I also focus on
the most extreme case of institutions preventing ￿rms from screening hires. I refer to the
post-war Italian labor market, where the allocation of blue-collar workers to the ￿rms was
decided by government placement o¢ ces on the basis of a set of criteria totally unrelated
to productivity. Despite the old-standing interest for issues related to information in labour
economics, little work has been done to understand how labor market institutions a⁄ect
macroeconomic performance by a⁄ecting the disclosure of information about match quality.
This is the gap I try to ￿ll with the ￿rst two chapters of my thesis.
The motivation for the ￿rst chapter lies in the deep transformation of the Italian labor
market institutions that occurred during the 1990s. Prior to 1991, the cornerstone of the
Italian labor market regulation, Act 264 of 1949, prevented ￿rms from choosing directly the
workers they wanted to hire. Instead, workers could be hired only through public placement
agencies. In the case of manual workers, ￿rms could only make a numerical request to
these agencies, specifying the number of workers they needed. The public agencies would
have then selected the workers to be hired, on the basis of their economic need to ￿nd a
job. Besides hindering screening procedures prior to forming a match, the Italian legislator
restricted access to temporary contracts and limited the duration of probationary periods.
Brie￿ y, ￿rms could only draw up permanent contracts, having little information on the
characteristics of the workers. Since the beginning of the 1990s, major reforms of the labor
market were implemented, which have substantially increased the ability of the ￿rms to





The main result of the ￿rst chapter is to show that when workers have private informa-
tion about their type, institutions that prevent ￿rms from screening workers generate wage
compression within groups of observationally equivalent workers and higher average wages
at the cost of higher unemployment. The theoretical predictions that can be derived from
the model are in line with some stylized facts on the Italian labor market before and after
the reforms of the 1990s. Technically, the main contribution of the paper is in bargaining
theory. The model requires solving a bargaining game of incomplete information. This is
necessary since the standard Nash bargaining assumption is no longer applicable with one-
sided imperfect information on the payo⁄s. The standard way of modeling bargaining in
this case is to assume that either the worker or the ￿rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er
with given probabilities. One feature of this game which makes it particularly attractive
is that under the limit case of perfect information the solution is the commonly used Nash
bargaining criterion.
The second chapter builds on the vast literature investigating the impact of the reforms
of temporary contracts. Most of the models in this ￿eld embed the mainstream view that
temporary contracts are an instrument which o⁄ers more ￿ exibility to the ￿rms to adjust
employment faced with changing aggregate labor market conditions or idiosyncratic demand
shocks. This view has always been well rooted among both academics and policy-makers, as
historically, the main reason temporary contracts were introduced into Europe was the idea
that higher labor market ￿ exibility would permanently decrease unemployment. However,
in the recent years, several empirical studies in the literature suggest that the main reason
why ￿rms use temporary contract is not to use temporary workers as a bu⁄er stock, but
rather to screen them for permanent positions. In my second chapter I embed this idea into
an equilibrium model of the labor market in order to assess the macroeconomic implications
of this perspective.
The model provides a framework which is suited to address most of the questions raised in
this literature, that is, how temporary contracts interact with other labor market institutions,
and how they a⁄ect unemployment rates, productivity, hiring practices, turnover rates, wage
di⁄erentials, career prospects and welfare. As opposed to the model in the ￿rst chapter, there
is no private information about match quality, but bilateral imperfect information. The
main mechanism of the model through which temporary contracts a⁄ect the labor market
equilibrium is very simple. In a framework where most of the separations at short tenure are
driven by learning about match quality, temporary contracts increase the value of posting
vacancies since they allow workers to be screened without incurring any cost if a bad match




is terminated. The quantitative analysis of the model exploits estimates for the process of
learning about match quality by Pries (2004). Again, the reforms of the Italian labor market
implemented in the late 1990s provide an ideal laboratory for the calibration. Since Italy
is the OECD country with the lowest probation period, it is where the e⁄ects of temporary
contracts through the screening device are expected to be the largest. It is found that the
model is successful in matching a number of stylized facts including the transition rates
into permanent employment, the size of the wage di⁄erential, the turnover rates, and the
drop in the unemployment rate following the reforms. If temporary contracts are used as a
screening device, they can lead to a substantial increase in welfare, but their quantitative
impact crucially hinges on dismissal costs and minimum wages.
In the third chapter of my thesis, which is a joint work with my supervisor Salvador
Ortigueira, we investigate instead the unemployment volatility puzzle, the most popular
subject of analysis in the macro labor literature of the last few years. It is well known in
this ￿eld that the standard textbook matching model is not able to account for the observed
magnitude of ￿ uctuations in labor market tightness. As discussed in Pissarides (2008), up to
now the most successful attempts to solve the puzzle still present major ￿ aws. Alternative
calibrations which can generate volatility deliver an excess sensitivity of unemployment to
unemployment bene￿ts, and models which have introduced wage stickiness are incompatible
with the high correlation between wages and productivity observed in new matches.
In our paper we retain the assumption of Nash negotiation of wages, and contribute to the
literature by endogenizing labor productivity to the ￿rm￿ s investment and hiring decisions.
With this aim, we remove the assumption of employer-worker pair and assume instead the
standard neoclassical ￿rm that employs many workers and owns capital. An additional
important assumption, is that we introduce adjustment costs, meaning that accomodating
new units of labor and capital within the ￿rm is costly. We then explore the ability of the
model to amplify ￿ uctuations in labor market variables following shocks to both neutral and
investment-speci￿c technology. An important consequence of the large-￿rms assumption is
the so called intra-￿rm bargaining, that is, the fact that the ￿rm anticipates the wage e⁄ects
of its hiring and investment policy. By virtue of intra￿rm bargaining, we show that the wage
function becomes increasing in the level of neutral technology and decreasing in investment
speci￿c technology.
We ￿nd that shocks to investment-speci￿c technology account for about 40% of ￿ uc-
tuations in labor productivity. Within our model, this type of shock exibits considerable
propagation and ampli￿cation properties, which are very close to what is found in the data.
The heart of the mechanism is rooted in the interactions between employment and capital in




the adjustment cost function and their impact on wages. Unlike shocks to neutral technology,
investment-speci￿c shocks introduce a bias in favor of capital by lowering its price. Thus, a
decrease in the price of the investment good yields an immediate sharp increase in invest-
ment with a consequent increase in adjustment costs. In order to spread out these (convex)
costs over time, the ￿rm￿ s optimal policy calls for a delay in the increase of hiring after
the shock. That is, the ￿rm builds up ￿rst the capital stock, taking advantage of its lower
price, and then creates more vacancies. Indeed, both net labor productivity and vacancies
are hump-shaped, showing an initial drop followed by a subsequent prolonged increase. The
delayed increase in vacancies is fostered by the dampening e⁄ect of investment technology
shocks on wages. Intra-￿rm wage bargaining implies that the ￿rm shares adjustment costs
with the workers, and thus, investment-speci￿c shocks do not create a perfect correlation
between labor productivity and wages.














UNEMPLOYMENT AND WITHIN-GROUP WAGE
INEQUALITY: CAN INFORMATION EXPLAIN THE
TRADE-OFF?
1.1 Introduction
To explain the di⁄erent performance of OECD countries in terms of unemployment and
wage inequality, the theoretical and empirical literature has investigated the role of di⁄erent
institutions such as minimum wages, unemployment bene￿ts, employment protection and
centralization in wage bargaining. Many of these studies have documented the existence of
a trade-o⁄ between unemployment and wage inequality, and for the most part they have
focused on total inequality in the aggregate wage distribution.1 Little research instead has
investigated the sources of within group wage inequality, i.e., wage dispersion within groups of
observationally equivalent workers. As Acemoglu (2002, p.14) points out ￿we know relatively
little about the determinants of residual inequality,...[or] about cross-country di⁄erences in
the behavior of wage inequality... [and] much more research in this topic is needed￿ .
This paper contributes to ￿ll the gap on the theoretical side by presenting a novel deter-
minant of unemployment and within-group wage inequality which implies a trade-o⁄between
the two. The focus is on the broad set of institutions which prevent ￿rms from screening
workers. Lazear (1995) shows that ￿rms can extract information about the non-observable
determinants of workers￿productivity through the use of screening tests. I argue that the
amount of information that can be extracted is a⁄ected by labor market institutions. I
thus de￿ne institutions preventing screening (hereafter IPS) as all the rules and regulations
that may, directly or indirectly, prevent ￿rms from obtaining information which is useful to
predict workers￿productivity.
As it is carefully documented in the next section, IPS had a fundamental importance in
the functioning of the Italian labor market. Following WWII, the cornerstone of the Italian
labor market regulation, Act 264 of 1949, prevented ￿rms from choosing directly the workers
they wanted to hire. Instead, workers could be hired only through public placement agencies.
In the case of manual workers, ￿rms could only make a numerical request to these agencies,
1See Blau and Kahn (1999) for a review and Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2001).
1
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specifying the number of workers they needed. The public agencies would have then selected
the workers to be hired, on the basis of their economic need to ￿nd a job. Besides hindering
screening procedures prior to forming a match, the Italian legislator, following post-war
European standards, restricted access to temporary contracts and limited the duration of
probationary periods. As a consequence, ￿rms in the Italian labor market were also hindered
in screening workers on the job. Brie￿ y, ￿rms could only draw up permanent contracts,
having little information on the characteristics of the workers. IPS can be thus considered
as a distinctive feature of the Italian labor market, and to some extent of the European
labor market, as opposed to the US labor market. Nevertheless, as documented in the next
section, the evolution of the Italian juridical system suggests that the in￿ uence of IPS has
been strongly declining since the beginning of the 1990s.
In order to assess the e⁄ects of IPS, the standard matching model presented by Pissarides
(2000) is extended in the following directions. First, workers are no longer identical: hetero-
geneity across workers re￿ ects permanent di⁄erences in individual productivity. Second, as is
common in adverse selection models of the labor market, individual productivity is known to
the worker but not to the ￿rm at the time the worker is hired. Third, contracts are bargained
once and for all, and they cannot be conditional on future performance. Finally, it is assumed
that a worker must take a screening test upon matching. The outcome of the screening test
is for the ￿rm a noisy signal over the productivity type. Labor market institutions a⁄ecting
the information content of the screening procedures are modeled as a parameter de￿ned over
a continuous support which represents the precision of this signal. IPS are associated with
a relatively low degree of precision. Changes in the parameter representing labor market in-
stitutions will allow all intermediate scenarios of incomplete information to be represented,
ranging from the case in which the signal is completely uninformative to the case in which
the signal reveals the worker￿ s type perfectly.
The model requires solving a bargaining game of incomplete information. This is neces-
sary since the commonly used Nash bargaining criterion is no longer applicable with one-sided
imperfect information on the payo⁄s. The standard way for modeling bargaining in this case
is to assume that either the worker or the ￿rm makes a take-it or leave-it o⁄er with given
probabilities. This approach has been exploited in the context of macroeconomic models of
the labor market also by Kennan (2006) and Tawara (2005), but for the opposite case in
which the ￿rm has private information over the productivity of the worker. In the modeling
of this bargaining procedure, I add on their work by considering signal extraction. One
feature of this game which makes it particularly attractive is that under perfect information
the solution is the commonly used Nash bargaining criterion (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004).
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The model builds on the literature of asymmetric information in matching models with
heterogeneous agents. Three papers that are worth mentioning in this ￿eld of study are
Strand (2000), Montgomery (1999) and Pries and Rogerson (2005). Strand (2000) shows
that a lack of information on workers￿characteristics may lead ￿rms to employ too few
workers. His work is based on the assumption that in a market with no frictions ￿rms can
reward workers for their productivity after having paid a ￿xed screening cost. This paper
departs from his study in two directions: frictions are introduced to analyze the behavior of
unemployment at equilibrium, and imperfect screening to study the e⁄ects of IPS.
Montgomery (1999) builds a dynamic matching model with heterogeneous agents and
adverse selection. While he assumes an exogenous wage rate, wage compression arises en-
dogenously in this framework and reacts both to the composition of the unemployment pool
and to the nature of labor market institutions.
Pries and Rogerson (2005) build a model to account for the fact that worker turnover
in Europe is much less than in the US. While they assume workers to be homogeneous
before matching, and information about match-speci￿c productivity to be unobservable upon
bargaining both for the worker and for the ￿rm, in this paper workers are allowed to be
ex-ante heterogeneous and to have private information about their type. Although Pries
and Rogerson (2005) recognize the importance that screening procedures might have on
the aggregate labor market equilibrium, they only investigate the role of standard labor
market institutions, and do not analyze how the equilibrium changes with the precision of
the screening procedures. This is the task I take up in this paper.
This work identi￿es two sources of within-group wage inequality. The ￿rst is random
bargaining power and stems from the assumptions about the bargaining game: workers with
the same observable and non-observable characteristics might be paid di⁄erently as they
could have di⁄erent bargaining powers upon matching. The second source is the precision of
the signal, which measures how labor market institutions a⁄ect the information content of
the screening procedures. It is shown that the bargaining game yields two di⁄erent equilibria
depending on this. The main result is that when institutions prevent ￿rms from screening
so that the precision of the signal is low, within-group wage dispersion is low, the average
wage is high and the unemployment rate is high. On the contrary, when the precision of the
signal is accurate, within-group wage dispersion is high, the average wage is low, and the
unemployment rate is low. The model also gives the following predictions. Increasing the
information content of the screening procedures from the lowerbound to the upperbound of
the support of admissible values, shows a jump in within-group wage inequality, but not in
the unemployment rate. This jump is the result of a shift in the equilibrium strategies of the
Faccini, Renato (2009), Three Essays in Macro Labor Theory 
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game. Further increases to the right of the threshold that triggers the shift strictly decrease
the unemployment rate.
In order to test the predictions of the model, using micro-data from the Historical Archive
of the Bank of Italy￿ s Survey of Household Income and Wealth, I compute the behavior of
the residual wage inequality four years before and after the removal of the system of numeric
placement lists, in 1991, for the workers passing through the lists. The pattern of wage
inequality shows a jump of about 30% following the reforms of the placement agencies.
Within this framework, the jump can be interpreted as the outcome of di⁄erent equilibrium
strategies in the bargaining game, produced by di⁄erent labor market institutions a⁄ecting
the information content of the screening procedures.
The results of the paper have also two other important implications. Concerning cross-
country di⁄erences in residual wage inequality, the model can o⁄er an alternative explanation
for the ￿ndings of Flinn (2002), who shows that residual wage inequality in 1989 was consid-
erably lower in Italy than in the US. Concerning the behavior of the unemployment rate in
Italy, the model can contribute to explain the drop in the unemployment rate that followed
the reforms of 1997 and 2003, which enhanced access to temporary contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 documents IPS in Italy. The model is
presented in Section 1.3 and it is solved numerically in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 presents the
empirical evidence, and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 An interesting example of IPS: the case of Italy
Following WWII, in Italy, the economic inequalities brought about by the war and the
spread of the communist ideology sharply oriented the legislator towards the target of social
justice. These historical and political considerations, together with the desire to prevent
labor exploitation and fraud, explain the creation of Act 264 of 1949, which was, until recent
years, the cornerstone of the Italian labor market regulation.2 In principle, Act 264 of 1949
prevented employers from hiring directly, or through private placement agencies, the workers
they needed. Following international labor standards of the time, any private intermediation
activity between labor supply and demand was penally forbidden. Firms were therefore
obliged to resort to public placement agencies. In the case of manual workers, ￿rms could
only make a numerical request to these agencies, specifying the number of workers they
needed, while the selection of the workers to be hired was up to the agencies. Job-seekers
were sorted into di⁄erent lists according to their professional category, the so-called liste di
2See ￿Temporary Work and Labour Law of the European Community and Member States￿ , 1993, Kluwer
Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, The Netherlands.
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collocamento, and within each classi￿cation they were graded according to their economic
need to ￿nd a job. This grading had to take into consideration ranking criteria such as the
number of children and the family income of the job-seeker. Among two equally graded job-
seekers, the one that enrolled ￿rst prevailed. If a ￿rm hired workers outside the numerical
lists, it would incur in penal and administrative sanctions. Moreover, a labor contract signed
between the parties in violation of Act 264 of 1949 was null and void if the local organisms of
the Ministry of Labor reported it within a year from the signature. Since 1949, the scope of
the act has been partially reduced by a number of additional acts (Act 300 of 1970, Act 79 of
1983, Act 863 of 1984 and Art.17 of Act 56 of 1987) implementing derogations to this rigid
system and allowing in some cases for individuals to be speci￿cally requested, rather then
derived from the numerical lists. The system of numerical requests was ￿nally abrogated by
Act 223 of 1991. It is clear that as long as the ￿rms could not hire workers on the grounds
of their ability, they were de jure prevented from screening.
The Italian legislator went even further in preventing ￿rms from screening, by limiting
both the duration of probation periods and access to temporary contracts. According to
the indicators reported by the OECD (1999), by the end of the 1990s the Italian legislation
provided for the lowest probation period among all OECD countries. It is very likely that
such a short time span hampered the ability of employers to collect relevant information on
the productivity of the workers.3
As an alternative to hiring on probation for a permanent position, ￿xed-term contracts
can be used by ￿rms to test the ability or the motivation of a worker. In this sense tem-
porary contracts have been considered, in a series of recent papers, as screening devices
that are similar to probation. In particular, Varejao and Portugal (2003), in a study on the
Portuguese labor market, ￿nd that screening workers for permanent positions is the single
most important reason why ￿rms use these types of contracts. In general, this view has
been supported by strong empirical evidence.4 The importance of ￿xed-term contracts as a
screening device has been discovered only recently, and its implications at the macro level
are not yet clear. However, the new body of empirical evidence looks like a challenge for the
standard macroeconomic perspective that has always considered temporary work mainly as
an instrument capable of guaranteeing separation at low or zero ￿ring costs.5 Unlike other
3Ichino and Muelheusser (2004) show that if the length of the probation period is too short, shirkers have
an incentive to mimic the behavior of high type workers in order to pass the hiring test. In this case the test
is uninformative on workers￿characteristics and worthless as a screening device.
4See, among many others, Autor (2001), Autor and Houseman (2005), Boockman and Hagen (2005),
Houseman (2001), Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2004), and Storrie (2002).
5Cahuc and Postel Vinay (2002) p.64, write: "It is generally concluded that the introduction of ￿xed
duration contracts is equivalent to the reduction of ￿ring costs and that its impact on unemployment is
therefore ambiguous".
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countries in Europe, Italy had no speci￿c regulation for temporary work and private place-
ment agencies until the Treu law was approved, in 1997.6 As a result, this reform had an
enormous impact on the Italian labor institutions. More recently, with the Act 30 of 14 Feb-
ruary 2003, better known as Legge Biagi, the regulation of temporary contracts introduced
in 1997 was extended to further enhance labor market ￿ exibility.
Given that the institutions above have played a key role in shaping the functioning of
the Italian labor market, it is possible to consider them as marking a major institutional
di⁄erence with respect to US-style labor markets. In the next section a model is presented




The economy is characterized by a continuum of identical ￿rms and heterogenous work-
ers, both risk neutral and in￿nitely lived. The set of workers I has unit measure. Each
worker i 2 I can be either employed or unemployed and has private information over her
type pro￿le, ￿i 2 ￿, where ￿ = fl;hg is the space of type pro￿les, and l and h denote low
and high type workers, respectively. A fraction x of workers are low types, and a fraction
1￿x are high types. High and low types di⁄er in their productivity, which is denoted by y￿;
and in the opportunity cost of employment, denoted by z￿, for ￿ = l;h. It is assumed that
yl < yh and zl ￿ zh. It is possible to think about the productivity of high and low types as
parameters capturing individual heterogeneity within groups of observationally equivalent
workers, i.e., workers with the same profession, education, age, and gender. Both types
search in the same labor market.
The labor market is frictional, and ￿rms which want to ￿ll a job post a vacancy. It is
assumed that each ￿rm can post one vacancy at most. Labor is the only factor of production,
and all agents discount future income at the exogenous rate r. Employment relationships end
exogenously at rate q leaving the worker unemployed and the ￿rm with a vacant position.
The matching technology:
The matching process is described by the function M (v;u); which represents the ag-
gregate ￿ ow of hires in a unit period. v denotes the measure of vacancies, and u denotes
aggregate unemployment, which is the sum of high and low type unemployed workers, de-
6Act 196 of 24 june 1997, "Norme in materia di promozione dell￿ occupazione.", Gazzetta U¢ ciale n. 154,
July 4, 1997 - Supplemento No. 136.
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noted, respectively, by uh and ul. Time is assumed to be discrete, but since I am only
interested in characterizing the behavior of the economy at the stationary equilibrium, I
omit the time subscript. The function M (v;u) is assumed to be strictly increasing with
respect to each of its arguments and such that M (v;0) = M (0;u) = 0: Lastly, it is assumed
that the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale. The probability that a vacancy













where ￿ represents the "tightness" of the labor market. The probability that a worker









and it is assumed to be equal for high and low type workers.
1.3.2 Workers and Firms
E￿i (!i) denotes the discounted expected income of the worker i 2 I of type ￿i 2 ￿
employed at wage !i, and U￿i the expected discounted income of the same worker when
unemployed. In each period, the employed worker i 2 I loses the job with exogenous
probability q. At the stationary equilibrium, the ￿ ow value of employment for a type ￿ worker
satis￿es the following condition, where the subscript i is omitted hereafter for notational
clarity:
rE￿ (!) = ! + q [U￿ ￿ E￿ (!)]; ￿ = l;h: (1.1)
Let us denote by ￿w
￿ and ￿f the payo⁄ expected upon contact by a worker of type ￿ and by
a ￿rm, respectively. Both of these values will be de￿ned later as the equilibrium outcomes
of the bargaining game. The ￿ ow value of unemployment for a worker of type ￿ satis￿es:
rU￿ = z￿ + ￿m(￿)(￿
w
￿ ￿ U￿); ￿ = l;h: (1.2)
c denotes the cost of holding an open vacancy and looking for an employee per unit of
time, and V the value of having a vacancy opened. The ￿ ow value of a vacancy satis￿es the
following Bellman equation:
rV = ￿c + m(￿)￿
f:
Using the free entry condition, V = 0, the expression above can be rewritten as follows:
c = m(￿)￿
f; (1.3)
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which implies that the expected pro￿ts of an entrant ￿rm must equal the expected costs of
keeping a vacancy open.
The ￿ ow value for the ￿rm of having a worker of type ￿ employed at wage ! is denoted
by J￿ (!), and satis￿es the following equation:
rJ￿ (!) = y￿ ￿ ! ￿ qJ￿ (!): (1.4)
1.3.3 Wage bargaining
It is assumed that wage bargaining is decentralized, and that workers and ￿rms are too
small to in￿ uence the market wage rate. Wages are set once and for all, and they cannot
be conditional on future performance. It is also assumed that ￿rms do not directly observe
the productivity of the workers upon matching, but that they know the composition of the
unemployment pool and can observe the realization of a signal ￿ 2 ￿, where ￿ = f0;1g is the
set of signals. It is possible to interpret the signal as the outcome of a screening test which
workers must take upon contact. We can think about job interviews, probation periods or
temporary contracts as examples of screening tests. When ￿ = 1; the worker passes the test,
while if ￿ = 0 the worker fails. ￿(￿j￿) denotes the probability that a worker of type ￿ sends
the signal ￿. The conditional probability ￿(￿j￿); for ￿ 2 ￿ and ￿ 2 ￿, can be expressed as
a simple function of the parameter s 2 [1=2;1]; which represents the precision of the signal:
￿(1jh) = ￿(0jl) = s (1.5)
￿(0jh) = ￿(1jl) = 1 ￿ s:
The parameter s is the probability that the test reveals the true type of a worker. When
s = 1=2, the signal is completely uninformative, while if s = 1 the signal reveals perfectly
the type of worker. More in general, the higher the value of s, the more informative is the
signal. In this framework the exogenous parameter s captures the way institutions a⁄ect the
predictability of worker types; IPS are associated with relatively low values of s: More in
particular, the benchmark case of s = 1=2 can be considered as a quite close characterization
of the Italian labor market for manual workers in the 1980s, when the system of numerical
placement lists prevented de jure any screening activity. In this framework, whether the test
is useful as a screening device ultimately depends only on labor market institutions.
The timing of the action is the following: wages are bargained at the beginning of the
period when a worker and a ￿rm are matched. At the end of the period, production takes
place and wages are paid. If the ￿rm makes negative pro￿ts the worker is ￿red and the
match is destroyed, while if pro￿ts are positive the ￿rm decides to keep the worker.
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The bargaining game is the following: Nature moves ￿rst, and decides whether the worker
with probability ￿ or the ￿rm with probability 1 ￿ ￿, makes a take-it or leave-it o⁄er. An
interesting feature of the model resulting from this bargaining protocol is that workers with
the same productivity may receive di⁄erent wages at equilibrium, since they might be given
di⁄erent bargaining powers upon matching. The subgame in which the ￿rm makes the o⁄er
is denoted by ￿f, and the subgame in which the worker makes the o⁄er is denoted by ￿w.
The next subsections characterize the equilibria of the two subgames restricting attention to
equilibria in pure strategies. The extensive form representation of the subgames and all the
proofs of the propositions that follow are presented in the Appendix.
1.3.3.1 The worker makes the take-it or leave-it o⁄er
The structure of this subgame is as follows. First, the type of worker matched is selected
with endogenous probabilities p(￿) = u￿=u; for ￿ = l;h. Second, Nature decides whether the
signal sent by the worker is 0 or 1, with probabilities given by (1.5). Third, the worker makes
the o⁄er, and fourth, the ￿rm accepts or rejects. Finally, when production takes place, the
￿rm decides whether to fire or keep the worker.
Strategies:
I denote by !w 2 R+ a wage o⁄er made by the worker and chosen from the set R+. A
pure strategy for the worker is a map !w
￿ : ￿ ! R+ from her type space ￿ to her wage o⁄er
space R+. An equilibrium wage o⁄er for the worker is denoted by ^ !
w
￿:
A pure strategy for the ￿rm is a pair of decision rules mapping from its information
set to the available actions a 2 A and b 2 B chosen from the set A = faccept; rejectg
and B = ffire;keepg at the relevant information sets. The decision rule ￿ a : R+ ! A is a
mapping from the worker￿ s wage o⁄er space R+ to the ￿rm￿ s action space A. The decision
rule ￿ b : fR+;￿g ! B is a mapping from the worker￿ s wage o⁄er space R+ and type space ￿
to the ￿rm￿ s action space B.
Payo⁄s:
If the ￿rm rejects the o⁄er, the worker gets U and the ￿rm gets zero. If the o⁄er of a
worker of type ￿ is accepted and the worker is not ￿red at the end of the period, the worker
gets E￿(!w) and the ￿rm gets J￿(!w). If the worker is ￿red, the ￿rm gets (y￿ ￿ !w)=(1 + r)
and the worker gets (!w + U￿)=(1 + r):
Beliefs:
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Let ￿(￿j!w) denote the belief for the ￿rm that the wage o⁄er !w is sent by a worker of
type ￿: The system of beliefs ￿ is derived from the strategy pro￿le !w
￿ through Bayes￿rule
whenever possible.
ASSUMPTION 1: the ￿rm decides to accept the wage o⁄er and to keep the worker if
indi⁄erent.
ASSUMPTION 2:
El(yl) ￿ (yh + Ul)=(1 + r):
If Assumption 2 holds, a low type worker prefers to earn yl until job destruction occurs
exogenously rather than earn yh for one period only and be successively ￿red. In section 1.4,
I assign reasonable parameter values to the model and check that this assumption is always
satis￿ed. As I prove formally in the next Proposition, the assumption that the ￿rm can ￿re
workers if pro￿ts are negative acts as a credible threat and induces workers to separate their
wage o⁄ers at equilibrium. As a consequence, the equilibrium strategy for the wage o⁄ers of
high and low type workers is separating, independently of the precision of the signal s:7
Proposition 1.1 Suppose Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold. Then the wage o⁄ers
^ !
w
￿ = y￿ together with the beliefs ￿(￿jy￿) = 1 for ￿ = l;h, the decisions of the ￿rm to accept
both o⁄ers and to keep the worker once productivity is revealed is the unique Perfect Bayesian
(Nash) equilibrium satisfying forward induction in subgame ￿w:
1.3.3.2 The ￿rm makes the take-it or leave-it o⁄er
This subgame has the following structure. First, the probabilities p(￿) decide the type
of worker that is hired. Second, Nature chooses the signal, with probabilities given by (1.5).
Third, the ￿rm makes the o⁄er, and fourth, the worker accepts or rejects. Finally, at the
end of the period, the ￿rm decides whether to fire or keep the worker.
Strategies:
I denote by !f 2 R+ a wage o⁄er made by the ￿rm and chosen from the set R+. A pure
strategy for the ￿rm is a map !f(￿) : ￿ ! R+ from the signal space ￿ to the ￿rm￿ s wage
o⁄er space R+ together with a decision rule ￿ b : fR+;￿g ! B mapping from the ￿rm￿ s wage
7The condition written in Assumption 2 would not hold if ￿rms were unable to ￿re workers, or if produc-
tivity could only be discovered after a long period of time. Relaxing this assumption would only increase
the complexity of the model without changing the qualitative results.
Faccini, Renato (2009), Three Essays in Macro Labor Theory 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/156271.3. THE MODEL 11
o⁄er space R+ and the worker￿ s type space ￿ to the ￿rm￿ s action space B = ffire;keepg.
An equilibrium wage o⁄er for the ￿rm is denoted by ^ !
f(￿):
A pure strategy for the worker is a decision rule ￿ a : fR+;￿g ! A mapping from the
￿rm￿ s wage o⁄er space R+ and the worker￿ s type space ￿ to the worker￿ s action space
A = faccept;rejectg.
Payo⁄s:
Payo⁄s follow the same structure as in the subgame ￿w.
Beliefs:
The ￿rm uses Bayes￿rule to update its prior beliefs, which are given by the matching














Assumption 4 imposes a restriction on the choice of the parameters yh and yl: Since rUh
strictly increases with yh at equilibrium, Assumption 4 imposes an upper bound on the
di⁄erence between yh and yl: This assumption ensures that the surplus created by a match
be positive when the wage ^ !
f(￿) = rUh is o⁄ered to a low type worker. If Assumption 4
holds, the ￿rm￿ s option to ￿re workers is never exercised at equilibrium, and therefore a
match can only break down for exogenous reasons.
Assumption 5 does not impose any parametric restriction. When the model is solved
numerically, I check that this assumption is satis￿ed for all the parameter values that support
an equilibrium solution.
The economic intuition for the bargaining problem of the ￿rm is the following. When
information is perfect, i.e., s = 1, the outcome of the test perfectly reveals the type of a
worker. If this is the case, when the ￿rm makes the o⁄er, a worker of type ￿ gets rU￿,
which is the lowest wage she is willing to accept. When instead information is incomplete,
the outcome of the screening test is no longer perfectly correlated with with the type of the
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worker. Under this scenario the ￿rm has to compare expected costs and bene￿ts associated
with each o⁄er. If the low wage rUl is o⁄ered, the ￿rm enjoys high future pro￿ts Jl(rUl)
if the type of worker receiving the o⁄er is low, but it forgoes any pro￿t if the type of the
worker turns out to be high. This follows since it is optimal for a high type worker to
reject any o⁄er lower than rUh: If instead the high wage rUh is o⁄ered, the ￿rm enjoys lower
future pro￿ts Jl(rUh) if the worker is low, but it still makes positive pro￿ts Jh(rUh) if the
worker is high. To put it di⁄erently, the ￿rm trades-o⁄ insurance against the breakdown of
wage negotiations with high type workers versus higher future pro￿ts with low type workers.
Conditional on the observation of the signal, it will be therefore optimal for the ￿rm to o⁄er
rUh whenever the following condition holds:
￿(hj￿)Jh(rUh) ￿ ￿(lj￿)[Jl(rUl) ￿ Jl(rUh)]; (1.7)
where the l.h.s. represents the expected gains from insurance and the r.h.s. represents the
opportunity cost of o⁄ering rUh: Whether condition (1.7) holds or not depends, in general,
on the distribution of worker types in the unemployment pool, on the outcome of the test,
and on the precision of the signal.
Proposition 1.2 Suppose Assumption 1, Assumption 3, Assumption 4 and Assumption 5
hold. Then the wage o⁄er ^ !
f(￿) = rUh, together with the conditional posterior beliefs system
in (1.6), the decision to accept for both low and high type workers, and the ￿rm￿ s decision
to keep the worker, is the unique Perfect Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium of the subgame ￿f for
any ￿ 2 ￿ such that condition (1.7) holds:
Proposition 1.3 Suppose Assumption 3, Assumption 4 and Assumption 5 hold. Then the
wage o⁄er ^ !
f(￿) = rUl, together with the conditional posterior beliefs system in (1.6), the
low type worker￿ s decision to accept, the high type worker￿ s decision to reject, and the ￿rm￿ s
decision to keep the worker, is the unique Perfect Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium of the subgame
￿f for any ￿ 2 ￿ such that condition (1.7) fails to hold.
1.3.3.3 The solutions of the bargaining game as a function of s
This section investigates how the equilibria of the whole game change with the quality of
information embodied in the signal. Since the equilibrium of the subgame ￿w is independent
of s, a change in the equilibrium of the whole bargaining protocol can only follow from a
change in the equilibrium of the subgame ￿f. I contrast the case in which the signal is
uninformative with the case in which the signal is perfectly informative and I show that the
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bargaining game exhibits di⁄erent equilibria. These two equilibria are characterized with
the payo⁄s expected by the players upon engaging in the bargaining game and with the
￿ ows in and out of the unemployment pool. Section 1.4 then shows numerically that for
all the reasonable parameter values supporting an equilibrium solution there exists a unique
threshold value of s, denoted by s￿, such that the bargaining game exhibits two di⁄erent sets
of equilibrium strategies, one for s 2 [1=2;s￿], and another for s 2 (s￿;1]:
CASE 1 The signal is uninformative: s = 1=2:
By (1.5) and (1.6), if s = 1=2; ￿(￿j￿) = p(￿) for ￿ = l;h: When the signal is uninforma-
tive the ￿rm￿ s beliefs are given by the matching probabilities and are therefore independent
of the realization of ￿: Consequently, also condition (1.7) must be independent of ￿. The
next section shows that condition (1.7) is always satis￿ed for s = 1=2 when reasonable para-
meter values are assigned to the model. The equilibrium wage o⁄er of the ￿rm is therefore
pooling when s = 1=2, with the ￿rm o⁄ering ^ !
f(￿) = rUh for both ￿ = 0;1:
Proposition 1.4 Suppose condition (1.7) holds for both ￿ = 0;1. Then a matched worker
is of type ￿ with probability:
p(￿) = x￿:
When the signal is uninformative both types of workers enter and exit from the unem-
ployment pool at the same rates. This has two implications. The ￿rst is that the relative
measure of type ￿ workers in the unemployment pool is equal to their relative measure in
the labor force, x￿. The second is that the equilibrium unemployment rate is the same for
high and low type workers.
We are now ready to characterize the expected payo⁄s for workers and ￿rms when
^ !
f(￿) = rUh is o⁄ered to a worker independently of the outcome of the test, ￿.




￿ = [￿y￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qU￿]=(r + q)
upon engaging in the bargaining game, and the ￿rm expects
￿
f = (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ x)yh + xyl ￿ rUh]=(r + q):
In the next section we will see that condition (1.7) holds in the interval of s 2 [1=2;s￿]
for both ￿ = 0;1. The equilibrium of the labor market is therefore described by equations
(1.1) to (1.4) together with the equations in Proposition 5 whenever s 2 [1=2;s￿]:
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CASE 2 The signal is perfectly informative: s = 1:
It is easy to show that when s = 1 condition (1.7) holds for ￿ = 1 but does not hold for
￿ = 0. Substituting (1.4) into (1.7), condition (1.7) can be rewritten as follows:
￿(hj￿)(yh ￿ rUh) ￿ ￿(lj￿)(rUh ￿ rUl) ￿ 0 for ￿ 2 ￿:
By (1.6) and (1.5) ￿(hj1) = ￿(lj0) = 1 and ￿(lj1) = ￿(hj0) = 0 for s = 1. Then (1.7) is
satis￿ed for ￿ = 1 since yh > yl, and yl ￿ rUh by Assumption 4. On the contrary, when
￿ = 0 condition (1.7) fails to hold by Assumption 5. The equilibrium wage o⁄er of the ￿rm
is therefore separating when s = 1, with the ￿rm o⁄ering ^ !
f(1) = rUh and ^ !
f(0) = rUl:
Proposition 1.6 Suppose condition (1.7) holds for ￿ = 1 but does not hold for ￿ = 0. Then







q + ￿m(￿)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)s]
:
By Proposition 6 it is possible to note that when s = 1 the unemployment rate u￿=x￿
is identical for both high and low type workers. For every value of s 2 (s￿;1) such that
condition (1.7) holds only for ￿ = 1; the unemployment rate will be higher for high than
for low type workers. When the signal is relatively informative high type workers who send
the bad signal reject the wage o⁄er. Therefore, they search more than low type workers,
on average, who accept any wage o⁄er at equilibrium independently of the outcome of the
screening test.
We can now characterize the expected payo⁄s for workers and ￿rms when the wage o⁄er
is conditional to the outcome of the screening test, so that a worker gets rUh upon passing
the test, and rUl otherwise:
Proposition 1.7 Suppose condition (1.7) holds for ￿ = 1 but does not hold for ￿ = 0. Then
a worker of type h expects a payo⁄
￿
w
h = [￿yh + (1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qUh]=(r + q)
upon engaging in the bargaining game, a worker of type l expects a payo⁄
￿
w
l = [￿yl + s(1 ￿ ￿)rUl + (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qUl]=(r + q)
and the ￿rm expects
￿
f = (1 ￿ ￿)[p(h)s(yh ￿ rUh) + p(l)s(yl ￿ rUl) + p(l)(1 ￿ s)(yl ￿ rUh)]=(r + q):
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By Proposition 7 it is possible to note that in the special case in which s = 1; when
information is perfect the average wage bargained by a worker of type ￿ = l;h, ￿y￿ +
(1 ￿ ￿)rU￿; is the outcome of the generalized Nash criterion. When the model is solved
numerically in the next Section, we will see that condition (1.7) holds for ￿ = 1 but does
not hold for ￿ = 0 in the interval of s 2 (s￿;1]. The equilibrium of the labor market is
therefore described by equations (1.1) to (1.4) together with the equations in Proposition 6
and Proposition 7 whenever s 2 (s￿;1]:
1.4 Numerical analysis
In this section numerical values are assigned to the model in order to analyze how the
equilibrium of the labor market is a⁄ected by a change in labor market institutions. The
parameters used for the exercise are reported in the table below.
yh yl x r c ￿ q z￿ ￿
:53 :47 :5 :025 :3 :5 :1 :4y￿ :5
Table 1.1: Benchmark parameter values
One unit of time in the model equals one quarter. Average productivity is normalized
to :5; and both types of workers are assumed to be equally distributed, so that x = :5. The
spread between high and low productivity is set arbitrarily, without any e⁄ect on qualitative
considerations. In line with the vast majority of studies, the matching process is represented
by a Cobb-Douglas function, written M(v;u) = u￿v1￿￿: The elasticity of the matching
function with respect to unemployment is assumed to be ￿ = :5; as in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1999). The bargaining power of the workers is selected to respect the Hosios
condition, and so ￿ = :5. Following Shimer (2005), the income value of an unemployed
worker equals 40% of her productivity. Quarterly job destruction is set to q = :10 as in
Shimer (2005), and the cost of a vacancy is c = :3. The quarterly interest rate is set to :025
as in Italy during the late ￿ 80s.
Numerical solutions of the model show that the game exhibits two sets of equilibrium
strategies satisfying assumptions 1 to 5. The equilibrium of the subgame ￿f is pooling when
the precision of the signal is low and s 2 [1=2;s￿], with the ￿rm o⁄ering ^ !
f (￿) = rUh for both
￿ = 0;1; the equilibrium is separating when the precision of the signal is high and s 2 (s￿;1],
with the ￿rm o⁄ering rUh when ￿ = 1, and rUl when ￿ = 0. The intuition for the result is
the following: so long as the screening device is not su¢ ciently reliable, i.e., s is below the
threshold, it is not pro￿table for the ￿rm to condition the wage o⁄er to the outcome of the
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test. If a ￿rm o⁄ers a high type worker a wage equal to the outside option of a low type
worker, the match breaks down, and its surplus is wasted. Therefore, the ￿rm will not o⁄er
rUl unless it perceives that the probability of facing a low type worker is su¢ ciently high.
This can only happen if the worker fails the test, and if the test is su¢ ciently informative
about the type of the worker, that is, if s is high enough. The equilibrium of the subgame
￿w is instead independent of s, so that a worker of type ￿ is paid y￿ whenever she makes the
o⁄er.
The equilibrium of the labor market in terms of wages, unemployment rates and wage
dispersion is reported in Figure 1 in the Appendix for the parameter values in Table 1 and
for s 2 [1=2;1]. For every value of s; I computed the standard deviation of wages as an
index of wage dispersion. Given the benchmark parametrization, all the parameter values
were changed one at a time as a robustness check for the qualitative results. The results
proved robust to all the changes which support an equilibrium solution and I summarize
them below.
1. When the precision of the signal is relatively low so that information is noisy, wages are
more compressed and unemployment rates are high; when the precision of the signal is
relatively high, information is accurate, wages are more dispersed, and unemployment
rates are low. A trade-o⁄ emerges between unemployment and wage inequality, which
is produced only by the quality of information.
2. When the quality of information embedded in the signal is very low, small variations in
s have no impact on the labor market equilibrium. Given the baseline parametrization,
￿rms condition their wage o⁄er to the outcome of the test provided that the signal
reveals the true type of the worker with a probability higher than 74%. At any lower
degree of precision, the signal is considered as uninformative.
3. The average wage drops at the threshold s￿ and strictly decreases with the precision of
the signal in the interval of s 2 (s￿;1]: For values of s below the threshold, both types
of workers receive rUh when the ￿rm makes the o⁄er. To the right of the threshold,
low type workers receive a wage o⁄er equal to rUh only if they pass the test, and
get rUl otherwise. Since Ul < Uh, the shift in the equilibrium strategies played by
the ￿rm explains why the average wage drops at the threshold. This e⁄ect largely
dominates the following counteracting e⁄ect: while all wage negotiations succeed for
s 2 [1=2;s￿], to the right of s￿ instead, negotiations fail whenever the ￿rm o⁄ers rUl
to a high type worker who failed the test. Therefore, at the threshold the fraction of
high type employed workers who receive yh is higher than to the left of s￿: This e⁄ect
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tends to increase the average wage, although its quantitative importance is relatively
minor. To the right of the threshold, both the fraction of low type workers receiving
rUl; and the fraction of high type workers receiving rUh increase with the precision of
the signal. Both e⁄ects therefore contribute to lower the average wage to the right of
the threshold.
4. The value of search for a low type worker drops at s￿ and its behavior is ambiguous
to the right of s￿: As the equilibrium strategies played by the ￿rm change at the
threshold, low type workers expect to receive lower wages upon contact, and their
value of search drops. Further increases in the precision of the signal decrease the
expected wage even more, but increase the tightness of the labor market and the exit
rate from unemployment so that the two e⁄ects o⁄set each other. When the equilibrium
strategies played by the ￿rm change at the threshold, high type workers expect a higher
rate of break-down in the wage negotiations but the same value of the match, since
they are indi⁄erent between working at the wage rUh or searching in the labor market.
The value of search for a high type worker strictly increases to the right of s￿ since the
exit rate from unemployment strictly increases with s:
5. At the threshold s￿ it is possible to observe a strong discrete change both in wage
dispersion and in the average wage, but not in the unemployment rate. While wage
dispersion jumps and the average wage drops at the threshold as a direct consequence
of the change in the equilibrium strategies played by the ￿rm, the behavior of the
unemployment rate at s￿ is ambiguous since it is driven by two o⁄setting forces. The
decrease in the average wage tends to increase the value of opening a vacancy, but
the increase in the failing rate of the wage negotiations tends to decrease it. Further
increases in s; instead, decrease both the average wage and the rate of break-down
of the wage negotiations with high type workers. Therefore, the unemployment rate
decreases without ambiguity at the right of s￿, although the average productivity of
the workers in the unemployment pool decreases with s, since high type workers exit
unemployment at a higher rate. To the right of the threshold the behavior of wage
dispersion is in general ambiguous, and depends on the parametric speci￿cation of the
model. As the precision of the signal increases, the increase in spread between the
wage o⁄ers rUh and rUl tends to increase wage dispersion. On the other hand, as the
rate of break-down in the wage negotiations with high type workers decreases with s, a
lower fraction of high type workers is employed at the wage yh, and a higher fraction is
employed at the wage rUh: This e⁄ect tends to decrease wage dispersion. As a result,
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the index of wage dispersion is roughly constant to the right of s￿:
6. When the precision of the signal is relatively high, s 2 (s￿;1), the unemployment rate
is higher for high type than for low type unemployed workers. Intuitively, when the
test is relatively informative on the nature of worker types, high type workers who fail
the screening test prefer to reject the low wage o⁄er and look for a new wage o⁄er. For
both types of workers the unemployment rates are strictly decreasing with the precision
of the signal since an increase in the e¢ ciency of the bargaining process increases the
pro￿ts expected upon entry and the matching probability. The unemployment rate is
decreasing faster for high type workers since an increase in s decreases their failing rate
in the screening test and increases their rate of exit from the unemployment pool. In
the particular case in which s = 1, information is perfect, and both types of workers
￿ ow out of the unemployment pool at the same rate.
The next section presents some empirical evidence which is consistent with the predic-
tions of the model.
1.5 Empirical Evidence
The main result of the model is that when individual heterogeneity is no longer pre-
dictable at the time of bargaining, the unemployment rate is higher and wage compression
arises endogenously within groups of observationally equivalent workers. Since IPS clearly
characterized the Italian labor market with respect to the US labor market, the model can
then o⁄er an alternative explanation about why within-group wage inequality was much
lower in Italy than in the US, as measured by Flinn (2002), using sample data of 1989.
Simulations of the model for the values of s 2 [1=2;1] show that increasing the precision
of the signal, from the lowerbound to the upperbound of the support, leads to a jump in
wage dispersion. Given that this jump re￿ ects the increased ability for the ￿rms to extract
information on the unobservable characteristics of the workers, what should be observed in
the data is a jump in residual wage inequality following a major increase in the precision
of signal extraction, provided that the initial condition for s is ￿low enough￿ . A natural
candidate for this type of reform is the abolition of the system of numerical placement lists,
as seen in 1991.
The micro-data from the Historical Archive of the Bank of Italy￿ s Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW) that allows for the computation of hourly wages is available
only after 1987. Survey data are collected every two years from 1987 to 1995. Since the next
survey available after 1995 is 1998, which is after the new wave of reforms that took place
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in 1997, I restrict attention to the symmetric time interval of four years before and after the
reform of 1991, the period 1987-1995.
I consider only full-year manual workers. Hourly wages are computed using information
on gross yearly income and average weekly hours worked, and assuming 48 working weeks
per year. Real hourly wages are then obtained by de￿ ating the nominal hourly wages with
the base 1991 CPI. I further restrict the sample to the category of workers who are less
than 30 years of age, for whom the likelihood of observing new entry-level bargained wages
is higher. The sample consists of approximately 4000 observations. Real hourly wages are
then regressed on a set of observable characteristics such as age, education, gender and
regional area, using dummy variables also for part-time jobs and survey years. The standard
deviation of the residuals, reported in Figure 2 in the Appendix by year, shows a jump of
about 30% following the removal of the numerical placement system in 1991. These ￿ndings
seem consistent with the predictions of the model.
However, other explanations could potentially be compatible with this behavior of resid-
ual wage inequality, such as the abolition in the early 1990s of the scala mobile, a wage
indexation mechanism granting the same absolute wage increase to all employees as prices
rose. It is generally believed that starting from the 1970s, the scala mobile played an impor-
tant role in shaping the behavior of wage inequality in Italy. Yet, the scala mobile hypothesis
seems hard to reconcile with the jump in Figure 2 since, as shown in a study by Manacorda
(2004), already by the mid-1980s this indexation mechanism had ceased to produce any
equalizing e⁄ect.
As described in section 1.2, the reforms of 1997 and 2003 were important in favoring
further access to screening devices by regulating temporary contracts. The model predicts
that these reforms would be followed by a decrease in the unemployment rate. The pattern of
the data is also consistent with these predictions: the unemployment rate started to decrease
in 1997, from 11.3%, to reach 6.8% in 2006. Furthermore, the unemployment rate steadily
decreased in this period, even during downturns in economic activity.
1.6 Conclusions
The microeconomic literature in personnel economics has thoroughly investigated the
importance of screening procedures such as job interviews, probationary periods and tem-
porary contracts in the ￿rms￿hiring policies. Yet, labor market institutions can a⁄ect these
hiring policies by either preventing ￿rms from testing the workers or by making the test
ine⁄ective as a screening device. In the case of Italy, these institutions played a central role
in the functioning of the labor market. This paper embeds such institutions into a standard
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matching model to analyze their macroeconomic consequences. The main ￿nding is that
by preventing ￿rms from screening workers, these institutions can reduce inequality among
observationally equivalent workers, at the cost of higher unemployment rates. The model
therefore o⁄ers an explanation for the well-documented trade-o⁄between unemployment and
wage inequality. It also identi￿es, in the institutions a⁄ecting the information content of the
screening procedures, a determinant of within-group wage inequality.
These results were obtained under standard assumptions on the bargaining protocol.
Following the literature on bargaining with asymmetric information, it was assumed that
either the worker or the ￿rm makes a take-it or leave-it o⁄er. Beyond ensuring tractability,
this assumption allows for the recovery of the Nash bargaining solution for the limit case
of perfect information. It is possible, though, that alternative bargaining protocols might
induce truth-telling equilibrium strategies for the workers, which can undue the perverse
e⁄ects of asymmetric information. Pursuing mechanism designs in this framework is beyond
the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
This paper takes a ￿rst step towards understanding the macroeconomic impact of labor
market institutions in￿ uencing ￿rms￿screening activity. Such institutions cover a wide range
of rules and regulations governing disparate juridical issues such as probation periods, the
space for possible contractual arrangements or the functioning of employment placement
agencies. All these institutions were condensed through the modeling strategy into a single
parameter representing the precision of the screening procedures. Although this allows for
the development of a simple framework to derive general conclusions, more speci￿c mod-
eling of institutions might help uncover, in future studies, new mechanisms through which
information a⁄ects the labor market equilibrium.
1.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let￿ s prove ￿rst that the candidate equilibrium de￿ned in
Proposition 1 is a PBE. Consider the beliefs ￿(￿jy￿) = 1 for ￿ = l;h: Given these beliefs,
the ￿rm accepts the o⁄ers !w
￿ = y￿ by Assumption 1. A high type worker would not o⁄er
more than yh since the ￿rm would reject whatever the beliefs o⁄equilibrium path. The same
worker would not o⁄er less since E￿ (!w) is increasing in !w: When making the o⁄er a low
type worker knows that the best response of the ￿rm is to ￿re her if pro￿ts are negative.
Then, she would not o⁄er more than yl by Assumption 2, whatever the beliefs o⁄equilibrium
path. Obviously, the low type worker would not o⁄er less than yl: Given this strategy pro￿le,
the ￿rm keeps the workers by Assumption 1. Given the beliefs, the separating wage o⁄er
^ !
w
￿ = y￿ is therefore sequentially rational, and the beliefs are consistent with this equilibrium
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strategy pro￿le. The candidate equilibrium is therefore a PBE. To show that this equilibrium
is unique, it is possible to concentrate on the set of o⁄ers !w 2 [yl;yh]: Any o⁄er below this
range would not be sequentially rational since the o⁄er yl would be accepted by the ￿rm
independently of the beliefs. Similarly, any o⁄er above the range would be rejected by the
￿rm independently of the beliefs. Within this range, I will ￿rst show that no pooling nor
separating PBE can exist in which a low type worker o⁄ers !w
l 6= yl: Then I will show that
the pooling o⁄er !w
￿ = yl and any separating o⁄er in which !w
l = yl and yl < !w
h < yh can
only be sustained as a PBE with beliefs o⁄equilibrium path which violate forward induction.
The ￿rst set of strategies are not sequentially rational since, whatever the o⁄ equilibrium
path beliefs associated with the o⁄er !w = yl the ￿rm would accept, and by Assumption 2 a
low type worker would have an incentive to deviate and o⁄er !w
l = yl. A PBE for the second
set of strategies could exist only if the beliefs associated with all o⁄ers !w : ^ !
w
h < !w ￿ yh
which lie o⁄ the equilibrium path, are such that the ￿rm optimally rejects them. This can
only happen if the belief that the low type makes this o⁄er is positive and ￿large enough￿ .
However, while a high type worker would be better o⁄ by having such an o⁄er accepted, a
low type worker would be worse o⁄by Assumption 2. Hence, if the ￿rm receives such an out
of the equilibrium o⁄er, it must be sent by a high type worker. By forward induction, the
￿rm can only assign probability 1 that a high type worker sends any o⁄er !w : ^ !
w
h < !w ￿ yh.
Therefore, it must be optimal for the ￿rm to accept any of these o⁄ers, and a high type
worker would always have an incentive to deviate and o⁄er yh:The separating o⁄er ^ !
w
￿ = y￿
is therefore the unique PBE satisfying forward induction.
Proof of Proposition 2. By backward induction. When making the o⁄er, the ￿rm
knows that for a worker of type ￿ = l;h the best response is to accept any wage o⁄er
!f : E￿ (!f) ￿ U￿, where the equality sign follows from Assumption 3. Then, by eq.(1.1)
a worker of type ￿ accepts any o⁄er !f ￿ rU￿ and otherwise rejects. By Assumption 5,
while both types of workers accept the o⁄er !f = rUh, only low type workers accept the
o⁄er !f = rUl. Since the value of a job ￿lled with a worker of type ￿; J￿ in eq.(1.4), strictly
decreases with the wage, given the best response of the worker, the ￿rm would never o⁄er
any !f(￿) > rUh: By Assumptions 4 the ￿rm knows that whatever is the type of worker
receiving an o⁄er !f(￿) ￿ rUh, pro￿ts will be non-negative and the ￿rm will keep the
worker by Assumption 1. If condition (1.7) holds for a given realization of ￿; the pro￿ts
expected from the o⁄er rUh; which both types of workers accept, are higher than the pro￿ts
expected from the o⁄er rUl, which only low type workers accept. Consequently, it must be
that the pro￿ts expected from !f(￿) = rUh are higher than the pro￿ts expected from any
!f(￿) < rUh. If this is the case, ^ !
f(￿) = rUh is the unique optimal wage o⁄er for the ￿rm
Faccini, Renato (2009), Three Essays in Macro Labor Theory 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/156271.7. APPENDIX 22
given the best response of the worker and the system of beliefs in eq.(1.6), for each value of
￿ that satis￿es condition (1.7). This wage o⁄er together with the Bayesian system of beliefs,
the decision of the workers to accept the o⁄er, and the decision of the ￿rm to keep the worker
therefore de￿ne the unique PBE of this subgame provided that condition (1.7) is satis￿ed.
Proof of Proposition 3. The Proof follows the same steps of the previous one. By
Assumption 3 and eq.(1.1) the best response for a worker of type ￿ = l;h is to accept any
wage o⁄er !f ￿ rU￿ and otherwise reject. If condition (1.7) fails to hold, the pro￿ts expected
from the o⁄er rUh which both types of workers accept, is lower than the pro￿ts expected
from the o⁄er rUl, which only low type workers accept. Since J￿ (!) is strictly decreasing in
the bargained wage it follows that, for a given realization of ￿; the wage o⁄er ^ !
f(￿) = rUl
is optimal and unique given the best response of the workers and the Bayesian updating of
beliefs. By Assumption 4 and Assumption 5 whatever is the type of worker receiving the
equilibrium o⁄er rUl, pro￿ts are strictly positive, and it is optimal for the ￿rm to keep the
worker.
Proof of Proposition 4. If condition (1.7) holds for both ￿ = 0;1, by Proposition
1 and Proposition 2 all agents accept the wage o⁄er at equilibrium. Both types of workers
therefore exit unemployment at rate ￿m(￿). At the stationary state, when job creation
equals job destruction, q (x￿ ￿ u￿) = ￿m(￿)u￿: From the former, u￿ = qx￿=[q + ￿m(￿)]:
Since the probability that a matched worker is of type ￿ equals p(￿) = u￿=u, substituting
the expression for u￿ yields p(￿) = x￿.
Proof of Proposition 5. By Proposition 2 the equilibrium wage o⁄er of the subgame
￿f is ^ !
f(￿) = rUh for both ￿ = 0;1. By Proposition 1 the equilibrium wage o⁄er of the
subgame ￿w is ^ !
w
￿ = y￿ for both ￿ = l;h. Then, using eq.(3.11) the expected payo⁄ of the
whole game for a worker of type ￿ = l;h is:
￿
w
￿ = ￿E￿ (y￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ (rUh) =
[￿y￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qU￿]=(r + q):
By Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, and making use of eq.(1.4), the expected
payo⁄ of the whole game for the ￿rm is:
￿
f = (1 ￿ ￿)[p(h)Jh (rUh) + p(l)Jl (rUh)] =
(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ x)yh + xyl ￿ rUh]=(r + q):
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Proof of Proposition 6. By Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, a low
type worker is matched any time she contacts a ￿rm. Low type workers therefore exit from
the unemployment pool at rate ￿m(￿): The equilibrium of ￿ ows implies that q (xl ￿ ul) =
￿m(￿)ul; which can be rearranged as ul = qxl=[q + ￿m(￿)]: By Proposition 1, Proposition 2
and Proposition 3, the contact between a high type worker and a ￿rm results in a match any
time the worker makes the o⁄er and when the ￿rm makes the o⁄er and the worker sends the
signal ￿ = 1, with probability s. A high type worker therefore exits unemployment at rate
￿m(￿)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)s]. When job creation equals job destruction it must be that q (xh ￿ uh) =
￿m(￿)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)s]uh; which can be rewritten: uh = qxh=fq + ￿m(￿)[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)s]g:
Proof of Proposition 7. By Propositions 2 and Proposition 3, it must be that
^ !
f(1) = rUh, and ^ !
f(0) = rUl. By Proposition 1, ^ !
w
￿ = y￿: Using (1.1) it is possible to write
the payo⁄ expected by a high and a low type worker upon contact as:
￿
w
h = ￿Eh (yh) + (1 ￿ ￿)[sEh (rUh) + (1 ￿ s)Uh] =
[￿yh + (1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qUh]=(r + q);
￿
w
l = ￿El (yl) + (1 ￿ ￿)[sEl (rUl) + (1 ￿ s)El (rUh)] =
[￿yl + s(1 ￿ ￿)rUl + (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ ￿)rUh + qUl]=(r + q):
Using (1.4), the payo⁄ expected by the ￿rm is:
￿
f = (1 ￿ ￿)[p(h)sJh (rUh) + p(l)sJl (rUl) + p(l)(1 ￿ s)Jl (rUh)] =
(1 ￿ ￿)[p(h)s(yh ￿ rUh) + p(l)s(yl ￿ rUl) + p(l)(1 ￿ s)(yl ￿ rUh)]=(r + q):
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Figure 1: Simulation results for the parameter values in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Residual wage dispersion for full-year manual workers younger than 30 years of
age in Italy. Author￿ s calculations from the SHIW panel of the Bank of Italy.
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REASSESSING LABOR MARKET REFORMS: TEMPORARY
CONTRACTS AS A SCREENING DEVICE
2.1 Introduction
Labor market rigidities are believed to be at the heart of the surge and persistence in
European unemployment after the mid 1970s. To date, the major policy response to high
unemployment rates has been the reduction of employment protection for new hires through
the liberalization of temporary contracts. However, theoretical models investigating tempo-
rary contracts are either inconclusive about the e⁄ects on employment and unemployment,
or predict an increase in the unemployment rate. Furthermore, several studies have also
pointed out that two-tier labor market reforms are likely to create segmented labor markets,
in which part of the workers are trapped in low-paid, low-productivity temporary jobs, with
little prospect of upward mobility. These predictions are in con￿ ict with recent empirical ev-
idence showing that, in Europe, temporary contracts correlate positively with employment
rates, and temporary workers enjoy considerably high rates of transition into permanent
employment.
This paper presents an equilibrium model of the labor market which is able to account
for this empirical evidence. Furthermore, it provides a useful framework which is suited to
address most of the questions raised in the literature, that is, how temporary contracts inter-
act with other labor market institutions, and how they a⁄ect productivity, hiring practices,
turnover rates, wage di⁄erentials, career prospects and welfare. The central assumption is
that ￿rms use temporary contracts to screen workers for permanent positions. As I show
in the paper, this hypothesis has been recently supported by a large amount of empirical
evidence.
The model extends the matching framework of Pries and Rogerson (2005) by introducing
the possibility for the ￿rms to o⁄er both temporary and permanent contracts. In particular,
it is assumed that ￿rms can o⁄er a temporary contract with an exogenous probability, which
depends on the strictness of labor market regulations. It is further assumed that the two
contracts di⁄er only in the associated dismissal costs. With Pries and Rogerson (2005), the
model shares the assumption that workers are both an inspection good and an experience
31
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good. At the time of matching, both the employer and the worker receive a signal over
the true quality of the match. A match is formed only if this signal exceeds a certain
threshold. If the match is formed, both parties learn about the true quality of the match
over time. A temporary match which turns out to be good is upgraded to a permanent
position, while a match which turns out to be unsuitable is destroyed. The main mechanism
of the model, which drives all welfare gains, is very simple and can be summarized as follows.
In a framework where most of the separations at short tenure are driven by learning about
match quality, temporary contracts increase the value of posting vacancies since they allow
workers to be screened on the job without incurring any cost if a bad match is terminated.
The main contribution of this paper is to present a model which, embedding the screening
hypothesis, can account both for the transition rates observed in most European countries
and for the evidence that temporary contracts correlate positively with the employment
rate. The model also o⁄ers a new explanation for the existence of wage di⁄erentials between
temporary and permanent workers. Since the ￿rm does not face dismissal costs if a temporary
worker is ￿red, the threshold signal required to hire a worker is lower for temporary positions.
Temporary workers are therefore less productive and earn lower wages. Besides explaining
wage di⁄erentials, the dynamic properties of the model are also consistent with the ￿nding
that workers starting their career in temporary positions are expected to catch up over time
with the wages of workers starting in permanent positions. Another important contribution
of this paper is that it o⁄ers a rationale for the ￿nding that temporary contracts seem to
act as an important screening device in European countries but not in the US. In Europe,
where it is expensive to destroy a permanent position, temporary contracts increase the
expected pro￿ts of a vacancy by allowing ￿rms to screen new hires on the job at no cost; in
an economy -the US- with no ￿ring restrictions, on the other hand both types of contracts
are equivalent and there is no reason to resort to temporary contracts to screen workers. In
general, the model shows that temporary contracts can reverse most of the negative e⁄ects
associated with permanent-employment protection and with its interactions with minimum
wages. Overall it is found that temporary contracts increase the worker turnover rate, the
average quality of the matches and welfare. For each of these results, I will elaborate on the
intuition below.
The model is calibrated to the Italian economy. Italy is a sensible choice to judge the
performance of the model for a number of reasons. First, Italy is the OECD country with
the lowest probation period on permanent positions. Second, Italy ranks second in terms
of the OECD (1999) employment protection index and undertook major liberalizations of
temporary contracts in the last ten years. For these reasons, Italy is the country where
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the gains from screening through temporary contracts are expected to be the largest, and
o⁄ers the best available laboratory to test the screening hypothesis. When the model is
calibrated with parameter values re￿ ecting labor market institutions in Italy, the simulated
economy can account for the transition probabilities from temporary to permanent positions,
the worker turnover rate and the existence of a wage gap between temporary and permanent
workers. Furthermore, a simple exercise of comparative statics can quantitatively replicate
the behavior of the unemployment rate in Italy in the last ten years.
The paper is organized as follows: the next Section relates the paper to the literature,
while Section 2.3 discusses some stylized facts. Section 2.4 presents the model. Section 2.5
calibrates the model and presents the quantitative analysis. The results are discussed in
Section 2.6, and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
This paper brings together the investigations initiated by Pries (2004) on how learning
about match quality a⁄ects separations in the labor market and the vast literature that
analyzes the macroeconomic e⁄ects of temporary contracts. Most of the existing models in
this ￿eld embed the mainstream view that temporary contracts are an instrument which
o⁄ers more ￿ exibility to the ￿rms to adjust employment faced with changing business cycle
conditions or idiosyncratic demand shocks. This perspective has always been well rooted
among both academics and policy-makers, as historically, the main reason temporary con-
tracts were introduced into Europe was the idea that higher labor market ￿ exibility would
permanently decrease unemployment.
Most studies in this literature have analyzed the impact of temporary contracts within
the traditional partial equilibrium framework of labor demand under uncertainty, pioneered
by Nickell (1986), and extensively analyzed by Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola
(1990). In this class of models the ￿rm has a stable permanent workforce, and adjusts the
stock of temporary workers to ￿ uctuations in economic activity (Bentolila and Saint Paul,
1992; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007). The main reason ￿rms use temporary contracts, in these
frameworks, is therefore to maintain a bu⁄er stock of workers who can be readily dismissed
when there is a need to adjust to economic downturns. Typically, in these models workers are
segregated according to their employment contract and enjoy no upward mobility. The most
important contribution that these papers have made in the literature is to show that higher
turnover and higher volatility over the business cycle is as much as one could reasonably
expect from the very much advocated ￿ exibility in the labor market. In an application to the
Swedish labor market, Holmund and Storrie (2002) ￿nd evidence of temporary employment
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being more volatile. While this class of models is typically inconclusive on the long-term
impact on employment and unemployment rates, Alonso-Borrego et al. (2005) present a
general equilibrium model following the same perspective and show that when it is calibrated,
unemployment should unambiguously increase following the liberalizations of TC.
Another important contribution in the literature is the paper by Blanchard and Landier
(2002). They take a di⁄erent angle on the analysis of temporary contracts, and show that
besides failing to reduce unemployment, TC might also create segmented labor markets with
low transition into permanent employment. The main idea is that due to the existence of
non-renewal clauses, if ￿ring costs on permanent positions are high compared to search costs,
when a temporary contract expires a ￿rm is better o⁄not renewing the contract, even if the
temporary match was of relatively high quality. In this case, high turnover on temporary
positions becomes part of the ￿rm￿ s personnel policies. In other words, temporary contracts
are mainly used as instruments of churning policies, implying that workers may go through
di⁄erent spells of unemployment before ￿nding a permanent job. As a result, transition
rates into permanent employment are low. Under this scenario, two-tier reforms of the labor
market decrease welfare, and most likely increase the unemployment rate at the steady state.
Similar conclusions have been reached by Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002).
Both the bu⁄er stock and the churning hypotheses have cast serious doubts on the gains
that can be obtained through the liberalization of temporary contracts. However, both
perspectives lead to predictions which are, to some extent, counterfactual. The fact that most
OECD countries are characterized by massive yearly ￿ ows from temporary to permanent
employment, that temporary workers enjoy substantial continuity in employment, and that
temporary contracts are found to correlate positively with employment rates within European
countries, cannot be accounted for within these frameworks of analysis. I will discuss these
￿ndings in more detail in the following section. Furthermore, a growing body of empirical
evidence in recent years, based on the observation of most European countries, has suggested
that there might be another important reason behind the use of TC whose implications are
still relatively unexplored in macro theory. There is now substantial evidence supporting the
hypothesis that ￿rms use temporary contracts to screen workers for permanent positions.
There are a series of papers, as surveyed by Ichino et al. (2008), showing that being
assigned to a temporary position has a large causal e⁄ect on the probability of ￿nding a
permanent match. The bottomline of this empirical literature is that temporary contracts
are stepping stones into permanent employment rather than dead-end jobs, and has been
interpreted as evidence in favour of the screening hypothesis. While these results are robust
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across European countries1, they are in contrast with those found for the US (Autor and
Houseman, 2005). Furthermore, a recent paper by Nunziata and Sta⁄olani (2007) using
data on the 15 major European countries, shows that measures of temporary-employment
protection are negatively correlated with the rate of employment in permanent positions.
This ￿nding has also been interpreted as evidence in favour of the screening hypothesis.
Finally, Varejao and Portugal (2003), using data on the Portuguese labor market, show that
"screening workers for permanent positions is the single most important reason why ￿rms
use these types of contracts". This paper embeds the screening hypothesis documented by
these studies into an equilibrium model of the labor market.
To sum up, the literature has identi￿ed the following three main reasons for the use of
temporary contracts:
1. as a bu⁄er stock against downturns in economic activity;
2. as instruments of churning policies;
3. as a screening device.
While the macroeconomic e⁄ects of temporary contracts under the ￿rst two hypotheses
have received a great deal of attention in the literature, the implications of temporary con-
tracts as a screening device have sofar been analyzed only by Nagypal (2002). With respect
to her contribution, this paper shares the result that as experimentation in the economy
increases with the use of temporary contracts, so does the productivity of the workers and
welfare. However, this paper di⁄ers in several ways from Nagypal￿ s (2002). First, it uses a
simpler process to describe the process of learning about match quality, and abstracts from
learning-by-doing. Second, the assumptions of an all-or-nothing learning process together
with the use of hiring practices produces a di⁄erent mechanism through which ￿ring costs
a⁄ect the equilibrium and reverse her ￿ndings that temporary contracts increase the unem-
ployment rate. Third, this paper calibrates the model on the Italian labor market. Finally,
this paper di⁄ers in the scope of the analysis, investigating the interactions of temporary
contracts with other labor market institutions, the transition rates implied by the model,
and the impact on hiring practices, turnover rates and wage di⁄erentials.
This paper is also directly related to the work of Pries (2004), who estimates for the
US labor market the process of learning about match quality. Pries (2004) shows that the
1Among other European countries, evidence in this direction is available for Italy (Adam and Canziani,
1998 and Ichino et al., 2005), for the United Kingdom (Booth et al. 2002), for Germany and the Netherlands
(Lechner et al. 2000; Dekker, 2001; Zijl et al., 2004), and for Sweden (Holmund and Storrie, 2002).
Faccini, Renato (2009), Three Essays in Macro Labor Theory 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/156272.3. STYLIZED FACTS 36
estimated process of learning by matching the high rates of job destruction at short tenures,
is key to reconciling the remarkable persistence of the unemployment rate over the business
cycle with the high job ￿nding rate measured in the data. Pries and Rogerson (2005) exploit
the process of learning about match quality estimated by Pries (2004) to build up a model
which is able to explain di⁄erences in turnover rates between Europe and the US. In this
paper, I investigate how the process of learning about match quality estimated by Pries
(2004) can contribute to improving our understanding of the macroeconomic implications of
temporary contracts.
2.3 Stylized facts
2.3.1 Stylized facts for European countries
This section highlights some important stylized facts accounted for by the model, which
refer to cross-sectional studies on European countries.
As reported by the OECD (2002), for most European countries workers employed on a
temporary contract in 1996 had at least a probability of about 40% to be employed in a per-
manent position one year later2. In other words, close to half of the total stock of temporary
workers moves into permanent employment within a year of time. Further more, quoting
the OECD (2002), p.131, "the evidence for European countries suggests that the majority
of temporary workers have considerable continuity in employment: being in employment
one year earlier and remaining in employment one and two years later". These statistics
reveal that most European countries are characterized by massive yearly ￿ ows from tem-
porary to permanent employment and by substantial continuity in employment, suggesting
that only a relatively small fraction of the workforce might be trapped into recurring spells
of temporary employment and unemployment. This considerable degree of upward mobility
and integration in the labor markets is di¢ cult to reconcile with the idea that temporary
contracts are used as instruments of churning policies. The yearly transition probabilities
among European countries range between 36% and 56% with only two notable exceptions,
Spain and France. In these countries a worker on a temporary contract had in 1996 only
about a 20% chance of being in a permanent contract one year later. Only in these two
countries have the reforms created a rather segmented labor market with low mobility from
temporary to permanent employment, suggesting that alternative forces leading to market
2The OECD (2002) computes transition probabilities across the states of unemployment, temporary
employment and permanent employment. They restrict the sample to the individuals beginning in dependent
employment or unemployment in 1996 and moving neither in self-employment nor in inactivity during 1997-
98. This makes their statistics directly comparable to our model.
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segmentation and churning could be dominant. I therefore summarize the ￿rst stylized fact
as follows:
Stylized Fact 1: European countries appear to be characterized by high rates of transition
into permanent employment.
While there has been considerable empirical literature focusing on ￿ring costs and sev-
erance payments, little empirical work has investigated the e⁄ects of temporary contracts
on employment and unemployment. A recent paper by Nunziata and Sta⁄olani (2007) pro-
vides the most careful multi-country analysis aiming to identify the correlations between
employment rates and a set of employment regulation reforms, including two-tier reforms,
implemented over the period 1983-1999 in 15 European countries. The regression analysis
controls for a large set of institutions, which include union density, bargaining coordina-
tion, the tax wedge, and unemployment bene￿ts, and for interaction e⁄ects between these
institutions. Importantly, following Nickell et al. (2005), the regressions also control for a
number of factors that can in￿ uence employment and unemployment rates in the short run.
These control variables include labor demand shocks, long-term interest rates, acceleration
in money supply, and terms of trade shocks. The authors ￿nd that looser regulations on
￿xed-term contracts and lower dismissal costs on permanent positions are signi￿cantly cor-
related with an increase in the employment rate. In particular, ￿xed-term contracts, which
constitute the bulk of all types of temporary contracts, seem to be associated with increases
in the employment rate in permanent positions, and this has been interpreted as suggestive
evidence in favor of the screening hypothesis. These results are robust to various changes in
the econometric speci￿cation. Previous studies focusing on broad indicators of employment
protection have often found positive correlations with the unemployment rate, although this
result is not always signi￿cant across studies (Howell et al., 2007). I summarize these ￿ndings
as follows:
Stylized Fact 2: Fixed-term contracts are found to correlate positively with the employ-
ment rate at the European level.
Another important ￿nding in the literature of temporary contracts, which has prompted
research in the ￿eld, is the existence of wage di⁄erentials between temporary and permanent
workers. The OECD (2002) reports evidence of wage penalties associated with temporary
contracts for all European countries. The average wage gap ranges from 17% in Germany, to
47% in Spain. Controlling for worker and job characteristics, the average wage penalty for
the countries surveyed by the European Commission Household Panel is 15%, and ranges
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from 7% in Austria to 24% in the Netherlands. Findings on the wage penalties for temporary
workers have been reported also by Booth et al. (2002) for Britain, by Dekker (2002) for
the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom, by Blanchard and Landier (2002) for
France and by Houseman (1997) for the US. I summarize these ￿ndings as follows:
Stylized Fact 3: Controlling for worker and job characteristics, workers on temporary con-
tracts are paid less than workers on permanent contracts.
There are a couple of papers in the literature which provide an explanation for the ex-
istence of wage di⁄erentials. G￿ell (2005) presents a theory based on an e¢ ciency wage
perspective. The basic idea is that ￿rms do not need to o⁄er an e¢ ciency premium in order
to provide workers with non-shirking incentives, since the possibility of non-renewal for tem-
porary contracts can achieve the same results. Alternatively, Bentolila and Dolado (1994)
suggest that if unions are dominated by permanent workers subject to ￿ring restrictions,
the existence of a bu⁄er stock of temporary workers might increase their bargaining power
and their wages. This paper o⁄ers a di⁄erent explanation for the existence of wage di⁄eren-
tials. Since ￿rms that o⁄er a temporary contract incur no dismissal costs, should the match
turn out to be of low quality, ￿rms have an incentive to use less selective hiring practices.
Therefore, temporary workers are paid less simply because they are less productive.
2.3.2 The case of Italy
In the model, learning that a match is bad entails costs of dismissal that are to be paid
only on permanent positions, not on temporary positions. However, it is known that in the
real world, no dismissal costs are to be paid if a worker employed on a permanent position
is ￿red during the probationary period. This trial period, which follows the beginning of a
new relationship, usually ranges in Europe between three and six months. Therefore, from
the perspective of this paper, there are gains to be obtained from temporary contracts so
long as it takes more than three or six months to discover the true productivity of a worker.
The shorter the period of probation, the larger the gains expected from screening workers
through temporary contracts.
Italy is the OECD country with the lowest probationary period and with the second
highest index of employment protection. In Italy, the common length for trial periods, as
established in the enforceable collective agreements, ranges between one and two weeks for
blue collar workers and between three to eight weeks for white collar workers (OECD 1999,
p.103). Italy is therefore the country where the e⁄ects produced by temporary contracts
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through the screening channel are expected to show up most clearly in the data. Furthermore,
in the last ten years, major liberalizations of temporary contracts have been implemented.
In Italy, the ￿rst important wave of reforms of temporary contracts took place in 1997. As
discussed by Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), the adoption of temporary contracts had already
been partially liberalized in 1984 and 1987, but unions were given the power to hinder
their di⁄usion. Only when this obstacle was ￿nally removed in 1997, could the use of
temporary contracts be adopted. A second wave of reforms, in 2003, further enhanced access
to temporary contracts. The picture in the Appendix describes the behavior of the labor
market, in terms of both the share of temporary contracts and the quarterly unemployment
rate, between 1996 and 2007. Both 1996 and 2007 were periods of expansionary economic
activity, and re￿ ect comparable business cycle conditions.
What emerges is a clear-cut negative association between temporary contracts and the
unemployment rate. In the ten years following the beginning of the reforms, the share of
temporary contracts almost doubled, increasing from 7.5% to 13%, while the unemployment
rate halved, dropping from 11.3% in 1997 to 5.7% in the second quarter of 2007, which
is below the European average. Furthermore, the quarterly unemployment rate steadily
decreased also during the downturns of economic activity early after the turn of the century.
This decrease in the unemployment rate was mirrored by an increase in the employment
rate, from 60.2% in 1996 to 65.9% in 2006. This increase in the employment rate is, to
some extent, a phenomenon that has characterized other European labor markets in the
last ten years. However, the magnitude of the phenomenon in Italy largely outweighs the
European experience. Moreover, in the last ten years Italy has been among the countries
in Europe with the highest employment content of growth, exceeding by far the average
European performance. The participation rate also increased over the period, from 59% in
1996 to 63% in 20063. However, it is di¢ cult to tell what impact this increase has had on
the unemployment rate. To the extent that the increase in the participation rate re￿ ects the
regularization of immigrant workers or, more generally, an emerging hidden economy, this
increase should reduce the unemployment rate. To the extent that it re￿ ects an increase in
the number of job seekers, attracted by the existence of new contractual arrangements, the
increase in the participation rate should increase the unemployment rate. Both phenomena
have certainly been relevant in the last decade.
The picture that arises is therefore one of a permanent decrease in the long-run unemploy-
ment rate. The thesis put forward in this paper is that the drop in the unemployment rate
3The statistics in this paragraph have been reported by the Italian national institute of statistics, Istat
(2006).
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was mainly produced by the liberalization of temporary contracts, which was, undoubtedly,
the major labor market reform of the last decade. Furthermore, the impact on unemploy-
ment and employment rates might have been more apparent in Italy than in other European
countries because of the unique combination of high employment protection and low proba-
tionary period. Up to date, very few models in this literature are calibrated, and none can
qualitatively account for a decrease in the unemployment rate. Section 2.5 shows that when
our model is calibrated to re￿ ect labor market institutions in Italy, it is able to qualitatively
and quantitatively account for the drop in the unemployment rate that occurred in the ten
years following the reforms of 1997.
2.4 The model
2.4.1 The Economy
This section presents a matching model of the labor market that builds on Pries and
Rogerson (2005).
The matching technology:
There is a frictional labor market and a unit mass of workers who can be either employed
or unemployed. On-the-job search is ruled out so that workers can only search for a job if
unemployed. Firms must post a vacancy to ￿ll a job, and the cost of keeping a vacancy
open per period is denoted by c. The measure of vacancies and unemployed workers at
time ￿ is denoted by v￿ and u￿. A standard constant-returns-to-scale matching technology,
M(v￿;u￿), determines the number of job matches per unit of time as a function of vacan-
cies and unemployed workers. Every period, a vacancy meets a worker with probability
M(v￿;u￿)=v￿ = M(1;u￿=v￿) = m(￿￿), where ￿￿ = v￿=u￿ denotes labor market tightness.
Similarly, a worker meets a ￿rm with probability M(v￿;u￿)=u￿ = ￿￿m(￿￿): It is assumed
that m(￿￿) ! 1 and ￿￿m(￿￿) ! 0 as ￿￿ ! 0, and m(￿￿) ! 0 and ￿￿m(￿￿) ! 1 as ￿￿ ! 1:
Production technology and learning about match quality:
The production technology and the process of learning about match quality are identical
to Pries (2004), and Pries and Rogerson (2005). A unit of production is a matched worker-
￿rm pair. All workers are ex-ante identical, but ex-post di⁄erent, since productivity is
match-speci￿c. The output of a match at any time ￿ is only observed at the end of the
period; and is given by y￿ = ￿ y + ￿￿, where ￿￿ is a mean zero random variable, uniformly
distributed over the domain [￿z;z]. ￿ y denotes the true quality of a match, which can either
be good or bad: if good ￿ y = yg, while if bad ￿ y = yb: When a worker and a ￿rm meet, the
true productivity of the match is unknown both to the worker and to the ￿rm, but they both
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observe the realization of a signal ￿, which denotes the probability that the match turns out
to be good. Any draw of ￿ is taken from a cumulative distribution H(￿) and is independent
across matches. The hiring decision takes place at the beginning of the period, and is based
only on the realization of this signal.
If a match is formed, each period the unit of production will try to infer the true quality
of the match by observing realized output. Whenever production falls in the range of y￿ 2
(yb + z;yg + z], the worker and ￿rm pair learn that the match is good, since a low type
worker is not able to produce such a high level of output. Similarly, if output falls in
the range of y￿ 2 [yb ￿ z;yg ￿ z) the match is revealed to be of low quality, since none
of such realizations is compatible with a high type worker. With probability denoted by
￿ = (yg￿yb)=2z, the true quality of the match is therefore discovered. With the complement
probability 1 ￿ ￿ nothing is learned since, due to the assumption of a uniformly distributed
noise term, the posterior probability equals the prior. The process of learning about match-
speci￿c productivity therefore takes an "all-or-nothing" form. Since I am only interested in
characterizing the stationary equilibrium of this economy, in what follows I will omit the
time subscript.
Contracts:
There are two types of contracts in the economy: temporary contracts and permanent
contracts. The existence of a dismissal cost d > 0; which is speci￿c for permanent positions,
is the only di⁄erence between the two contracts. The productivity of a match is therefore
independent of the contract, and remains unchanged throughout the duration of the rela-
tionship, unless an exogenous shock of job destruction denoted by ￿; and identical across
contracts, renders the match unproductive. Every period, a relationship ends either if the
quality of the match is discovered to be bad, or if an exogenous shock renders the match
unproductive.
The model is built to embed the hypothesis that ￿rms screen suitable workers for per-
manent positions. If a worker is hired on a temporary basis, the contract is then maintained
until the true productivity of the match is revealed. At that time, it is assumed that the
contract is either transformed into a permanent one, if the match turns out to be good,
or the relationship is severed at no cost, if the match turns out to be bad.4 If instead the
4Endogenizing the decision to upgrade temporary contracts into permanent contracts is beyond the scope
of this paper. The most cited reason for the conversion of a temporary contract is the existence of non-
renewal clauses. Usually, among European countries temporary contracts are no longer renewable after two
or three years. Given the learning process estimated by Pries (2004), and embedded in this model, by the end
of two years of tenure, virtually all of the matches would be classi￿ed as good or bad. At that time, all good
matches and only the good matches would be upgraded into permanent positions. In order to keep the model
as simple as possible, I do not explicitly model an up-or-out clause, and assume that temporary matches
are upgraded as soon as they are discovered to be good. It is important to notice that this simpli￿cation,
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worker is hired on a permanent contract, the relationship is severed whenever the match is
discovered to be bad, at the cost d. Temporary contracts then allow employers to save on
the dismissal costs which would otherwise be paid if bad workers were hired on permanent
contracts. Therefore, ￿rms always prefer to hire on temporary positions. Yet, it is assumed
that the ￿rm is allowed to o⁄er a temporary contract only with probability ￿: This parame-
ter thus represents the strictness of the regulation on temporary contracts. Labor market
reforms enhancing access to temporary contracts can therefore be represented by an increase
in ￿.5
Wages:
There is an exogenous minimum wage in the economy, which is denoted by ￿ !: Wages are
negotiated at the beginning of each period and cannot be conditional on the observation of
output at the end of the period. The wage of a worker in a match that is expected to be good
with probability ￿ is denoted by !i(￿), for i = T;I and is the solution of the generalized
Nash bargaining criterion for values of ￿ at which the minimum wage does not bind. The
subscripts T and I are used to denote temporary and permanent contracts respectively. For
reasons that will become clearer below, I is an indicator function equal to zero if the contract
is new, and equal to one if the contract is renegotiated.
2.4.2 Workers and ￿rms
This section characterizes the steady-state behavior of workers and ￿rms. Both are
risk-neutral.
The ￿rms:
The present discounted value of a vacancy, denoted by V , solves the following Bellman
equation:









where ￿ is the discount factor, and Ji(￿) for i = T;0 denotes the value to the ￿rm of having
which implies perfect screening ability, does not bias the selection of good matches into permanent positions.
Furthermore, G￿ell and Petrongolo (2007) ￿nd that in Spain, most conversions into permanent employment
take place before the end of their legal duration. They build a model where workers search on the job and
prefer a permanent contract over a temporary contract, everything else equal. In their framework ￿rms are
willing to upgrade the contract to reduce the probability that temporary workers quit. G￿ell and Petrongolo
(2007) provide evidence that conversion rates are higher for workers with a higher outside option, which
increases their probability of quitting. Their interpretation is that "as soon as a job match is perceived to be
productive enough, a ￿rm may have a su¢ cient incentive to promote a temporary worker, instead of keeping
him/her in a temporary contract for the entire legal duration " (G￿ell and Petrongolo 2007, p.160).
5The assumption that all ￿rms prefer to hire a new worker with a temporary contract might seem
restrictive. However, in Spain, which is the most deregulated country in Europe with respect to ￿xed-term
contracts, the fraction of new hires that were signed under temporary contracts in the period 1985-2002 has
constantly ranged between 91% and 97% (Guell and Petrongolo 2007).
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a worker matched with signal ￿ employed in a temporary contract or in a new permanent
contract, respectively.
Let b denote the disutility of work, and satisfy b ￿ yb: As long as the value of search for
an unemployed worker is positive, this condition is su¢ cient to ensure that bad matches are
terminated at equilibrium.
The value to the ￿rm of having a worker employed on a temporary contract reads as
follows:
JT(￿) = maxfV;￿yg + (1 ￿ ￿)yb ￿ !T(￿) + ￿￿V
+￿(1 ￿ ￿) f￿[￿J0(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V ] + (1 ￿ ￿)JT(￿)gg: (2.2)
The ￿rst three terms represent current period expected pro￿ts. If the match breaks down,
with probability ￿, the ￿rm is left next period with a vacant job, whose present value is
given by the fourth term. The last term represents expected future discounted pro￿ts if the
match does not break down. If the quality of the match is discovered, the ￿rm upgrades the
temporary contract into a permanent one if, with probability ￿; the worker is revealed to
be good, and ￿res the worker if, with probability 1 ￿ ￿; the worker is revealed to be bad:
Therefore, the ￿rm gets with probability ￿ the value of having a worker, who is good with
probability one, employed in a new permanent contract, and with probability 1￿￿ the value
of a vacant job. If, on the contrary, the productivity of the worker is not revealed, the ￿rm
keeps the worker in a temporary position:
Following a standard practice in the literature, it is assumed that dismissal costs are a
pure resource waste, which occurs whenever a job is destroyed. As such, ￿ring costs can be
considered as equivalent to a separation tax. When deciding whether to form a permanent
match, the ￿rm does not incur dismissal costs if the permanent match is not formed. Then,
dismissal costs are only paid when an ongoing relationship is severed. The outside option
of the ￿rm will therefore be di⁄erent whether the permanent contract is new or renewed.
This asymmetry between new and ongoing matches implies that the matched ￿rm-worker
pair must also be indexed to indicate whether it is a newly formed match or whether it
is a pre-existing match. The indicator I is then used to indicate a new permanent match
when it equals zero, and a pre-existing permanent match when it equals 1. The value to
an entrepreneur of a match that has received the signal ￿, for new and continuing matches
therefore satis￿es:
JI(￿) = maxfV ￿ Id;￿yg + (1 ￿ ￿)yb ￿ !I(￿) + ￿￿(V ￿ d)
+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)f￿[￿J1(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)(V ￿ d)] + (1 ￿ ￿)J1(￿)gg: (2.3)
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The interpretation of this equation is similar to the previous one, but here the negotiated
wage !I(￿) depends on whether the match is new or pre-existing. The wage function !I(￿)
equals the maximum between the minimum wage and the outcome of the generalized Nash
criterion.
The workers:












+ [1 ￿ ￿m(￿)]U
￿
; (2.4)
where ￿ denotes the probability that the worker is o⁄ered a temporary contract, and Wi(￿)
for i = T;0 denotes the value to the worker of being employed with signal ￿ in a temporary
contract or in a new permanent contract, respectively.
In the standard matching model, both the worker and the ￿rm decide simultaneously
whether to form a match. With Nash bargaining there is agreement on the decision of
forming the match, and the match is formed as long as the surplus is positive. The wage
then adjusts to split the surplus between the two parties according to a simple sharing rule.
This is no longer the case in this model since the minimum wage is binding. It might therefore
be possible, for some ￿low￿values of ￿; that the worker would like to form a match, but the
￿rm would not. If a match is formed only if both parties agree, then the decision of whether
to form a match depends only on the ￿rm, and the worker takes the decision rule of the ￿rm
as given.
The value to the worker of a temporary match that received the signal ￿, reads as follows:
WT(￿) = maxfU;f!T(￿) ￿ b + ￿￿U + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿f￿[￿W0(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)U] + (1 ￿ ￿)WT(￿)ggXT(￿)g; (2.5)
where XT(￿) is the ￿rm￿ s decision rule of forming a match, which is equal to 1 whenever
JT(￿) ￿ V , and equal to zero otherwise. Similarly, the value to the worker of a permanent
position in a match that received the signal ￿ is written as follows:
WI(￿) = maxfU;f!I(￿) ￿ b + ￿￿U + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿f￿[￿W1(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)U] + (1 ￿ ￿)W1(￿)ggXI(￿)g; (2.6)
where XI(￿) is the ￿rm￿ s decision rule of forming a match, which is equal to 1 whenever
JI(￿) ￿ V ￿ Id, and equal to zero otherwise.
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2.4.3 Equilibrium
The steady-state measure of temporary matches is denoted by eT, the measure of perma-
nent matches by eP; the measure of matches known to be of good quality by eg, the measure
of matches of unknown quality by en, the measure of vacancies by v, and the measure of
unemployed workers by u. At the stationary equilibrium job creation for each type of match
must equal job destruction. Denoting by E the expectation operator, the following equations
must therefore hold:
[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]eT = vm(￿)￿E[XT (￿)]; (2.7)
￿eg = (1 ￿ ￿)￿eTE[￿jXT (￿) = 1] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(eP ￿ eg)E[￿jX0 (￿) = 1]; (2.8)
￿eg + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(eP ￿ eg)f1 ￿ E[￿jX0 (￿) = 1]g = vm(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)E[X0 (￿)]
+eT(1 ￿ ￿)￿E[￿jXT (￿) = 1]; (2.9)
en = eT + (eP ￿ eg); (2.10)
u = 1 ￿ eT ￿ eP: (2.11)
De￿nition 2.1 A stationary equilibrium is a list of prices f!T(￿); !I(￿)g; quantities fv; u; eT; eP; eg; eng;
values fV; JT(￿); JI(￿); U; WT(￿); WI(￿)g; and rules fXT (￿); XI (￿)g; such that the
following conditions hold:
1. Value functions: Given !T(￿), !I(￿); u, and v, V , JT(￿); JI(￿), U, WT(￿); and WI(￿)
satisfy the Bellman equations (2.1) to (2.6).
2. Temporary match formation: Given !T(￿); !I(￿); u and v, XT (￿) is an optimal deci-
sion rule for the ￿rm.
3. Permanent match formation: Given !I(￿); u and v, XI (￿) is an optimal decision rule
for the ￿rm.
4. Free entry: Given !T(￿) and !I(￿); the ratio ￿ must be such that V = 0.
5. Bargaining on temporary contracts: the wage function must be such that !T(￿) =
max[!
N
T (￿); ￿ !], where the Nash wage function !
N
T (￿) solves
WT(￿) ￿ U = ￿ [JT(￿) + WT(￿) ￿ V ￿ U]; (2.12)
and ￿ denotes the bargaining power of the workers.
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6. Bargaining on permanent contracts: the wage function must be such that !I(￿) =
max[!
N
I (￿); ￿ !], where the Nash wage function !
N
I (￿) solves
WI(￿) ￿ U = ￿ [JI(￿) + WI(￿) ￿ (V ￿ Id) ￿ U]: (2.13)
7. Steady state: equations (2.7) to (2.11) hold.
The permanent match formation rule:
In order to solve for the equilibrium of the model, it is necessary to characterize the hiring
rules for the ￿rm. This implies ￿nding two cuto⁄values for the signal, denoted by ￿ ￿T and ￿ ￿0;
below which the ￿rms are unwilling to o⁄er temporary contracts and permanent contracts,
respectively. Let SI(￿) = JI(￿) + WI(￿) ￿ (V ￿ Id) ￿ U denote the surplus functions for
permanent contracts. Then S1(￿) ￿ S0(￿) = d: Intuitively, the surplus is higher for ongoing
matches since the existence of dismissal costs lowers the combined outside option of the two
parties. Substituting equations (2.3) and (2.6) together with the free-entry condition V = 0
yields:
SI(￿) = maxf0;￿yg + (1 ￿ ￿)yb ￿ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U + (I ￿ ￿)d
+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿S1(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)S1(￿)]g:
In a non-trivial equilibrium where ￿ ￿0 < 1; the value of S1(1) can be easily obtained from the
above expression, and equals:
S1(1) =
yg ￿ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U + (1 ￿ ￿)d
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
:
At the calibrated equilibrium the minimum wage is binding only for all the new permanent
contracts; for all the pre-existing permanent contracts and for all temporary contracts in-
stead, the minimum wage is not binding. I brie￿ y anticipate here the role played by the
minimum wage in this model. Intuitively, with Nash bargaining workers and ￿rms share
the costs of employment protection, through an initial transfer of resources. In calibrated
matching models of the labor market with employment protection, wages in the ￿rst pe-
riod of the relationship are usually negative. However, in the real world we do not observe
transfers of resources, and wages are never negative. A minimum wage in this setting simply
puts an upper bound on the transfer of resources that can take place at the beginning of the
relationship. The quantitative impact of the minimum wage and its interactions with the
other labor market institutions will be extensively discussed in Section 2.5.
The value to the ￿rm of having a worker employed on a new permanent contract can
therefore be rewritten from eq.(2.3) substituting the wage function with the minimum wage,
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and substituting J1(￿) with (1￿￿)S1(￿)￿d using the Nash sharing rule. The value function
now reads as follows:
J0(￿) = ￿yg + (1 ￿ ￿)yb ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿d + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿f(1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿S1(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)S1 (￿)] ￿ dg: (2.14)
Given that J0(￿) is strictly increasing in ￿, setting J0(￿ ￿0) = 0 implicitly de￿nes a unique
threshold value of ￿ ￿0. The permanent match formation equation then reads as follows:
￿ ￿0yg+(1￿￿ ￿0)yb￿￿ !￿￿￿d+￿ (1 ￿ ￿)f(1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿ ￿0S1(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)S1 (￿ ￿0)] ￿ dg = 0: (2.15)
Since the surplus of pre-existing matches is higher than the surplus of new permanent
matches, any given value of ￿ which is found acceptable at the beginning of a permanent
relationship also remains acceptable in future periods. This implies that ￿ ￿0 is the single
cuto⁄ value which is relevant to characterize acceptance decisions in permanent matches.
The temporary match formation rule:
The match formation equation for temporary contracts can be found using a similar
procedure. As before, it is convenient to de￿ne by ST(￿) = JT(￿) + WT(￿) ￿ V ￿ U the
surplus function for temporary contracts. Plugging equations (2.2) and (2.5) into the above




￿yg + (1 ￿ ￿)yb ￿ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ [S1(1) ￿ d]
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
:
Since the minimum wage is not binding for temporary contracts at the calibrated equilibrium,
a match will be formed only as long as the surplus is positive, with common agreement
between the parties. Given that ST(￿) is strictly increasing in ￿; the match formation
equation for temporary contracts can therefore be obtained by setting ST(￿ ￿T) = 0. This
equation reads:
￿ ￿Tyg + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿T)yb ￿ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ ￿T [S1(1) ￿ d] = 0: (2.16)
Free entry and job search:
At the stationary equilibrium, with free entry the value of a vacancy is zero. Substituting










where J0(￿) is given by (2.14).
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The value of unemployment can also be rearranged as follows, using the free entry con-
dition, the Nash bargaining rule ￿ST(￿) = WT(￿) ￿ U and substituting W0(￿) ￿ U =







ST(￿)dH(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)
Z
[S1(￿) ￿ d ￿ J0(￿)]dH(￿)
￿
: (2.18)
Duly substituting for the surplus equations and for J0(￿), the equations (2.7) to (2.11)
together with the equations (2.15) to (2.18) constitute a non-linear system of nine equations
in the following nine unknowns: v; u; eT; eP; eg; en; ￿ ￿0; ￿ ￿T and U: This system can be solved
numerically using Newton￿ s method.
The wage equations:
When the system is solved, it is possible to recover the Nash wage equations for new
and pre-existing permanent contracts by substituting (2.3) and (2.6) into (2.13). With a
binding minimum wage for new permanent contracts, the equilibrium wage functions are
!0(￿) = ￿ ! for all ￿ 2 [￿ ￿0;1] and !1(￿) = !
N
1 (￿) for all ￿ 2 [￿ ￿1;1]: Even if ￿ ! is binding
for all new permanent contracts, the Nash wage equation !
N
0 (￿) gives the shadow wage that
would occur if wages were freely contractible, given the surplus at equilibrium. The Nash
wage equations are written:
!
N
I (￿) = b + (1 ￿ ￿)U + ￿SI (￿) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿￿S1 (1) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿S1 (￿)]:
Similarly, it is possible to recover the wage equation for temporary contracts by substituting
(2.2) and (2.5) into (2.12). Since the minimum wage does not bind for temporary contracts,
!T(￿) = !
N
T (￿), and the wage equation is written as follows:
!
N
T (￿) = b + (1 ￿ ￿)U + ￿ST (￿) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)f￿￿ [W0 (1) ￿ U] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ST (￿)g:
2.5 Calibration
2.5.1 Parameter values
The model is calibrated to the Italian labor market in 1996, just before the ￿rst
wave of major reforms of temporary contracts, which took place in 1997. The calibration
strategy assumes that both Italy and the US share the same technology and the same process
of learning about match quality. Alternatively, this assumption implies that any di⁄erence
in the functioning of the two labor markets stems from di⁄erent labor market institutions,
namely ￿ring costs, minimum wages, unemployment bene￿ts and the degree of liberalizations
of temporary contracts. In the special case in which d = 0, the minimum wage is no longer
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binding, temporary and permanent contracts become equivalent, and the equilibrium of this
model collapses to the one in the benchmark economy of Pries and Rogerson (2005). The
calibration strategy therefore allows me to use several parameter values which were calibrated
in their paper to match US stylized facts.6
One period of time in the model equals one month in the calibration. Following Pries and
Rogerson (2005), the distribution function for ￿ is obtained from a normal with zero mean
and standard deviation ￿, truncated below zero and above one and re-scaled to integrate to
1 in the support. The parameter values used for the benchmark calibration are represented
in the following table:
￿ :32 A :4
￿ :13 ￿ :5
yb 1 ￿ :5
yg 1:9 ￿ :0085
b 1 ￿ :278
￿ :9966 d 5:16
c :249 ￿ ! 1:22
Table 2.1: Calibrated parameter values
The parameters ￿ and ￿ are crucial, since they capture the process of learning about
match quality. Their values, ￿ = :32 and ￿ = :13; were calibrated by Pries and Rogerson
(2005) in order to match relevant statistics estimated by Pries (2004) for the US labor market.
Since the results of the calibration are left unchanged if yb, yg, b, c; ￿ ! and d are all multiplied
by a constant value, the value of productivity in the bad state, yb, can be normalized to one.
yg is set to 1.9, as in Pries and Rogerson (2005). The spread in productivity was backed up
to match the percentage spread between the lowest and the highest wage observed at the
equilibrium with estimates by Topel and Ward (1992) on the wage increases associated with
job changes in the US. The discount factor ￿ is set to match an annual interest rate of 4%.
Following a common practice in the literature, the matching function is assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas, with the explicit functional form M(v;u) = Au￿v1￿￿: Both the elasticity
of the matching function with respect to unemployment, and the bargaining power of the
6More precisely, in the case of d = 0 and ￿ = 0; a minor di⁄erence with respect to the bechmark model of
Pries and Rogerson (2005) remains. As opposed to their paper, in this model I abstract from ￿xed costs of
opening vacancies since I am not interested in distinguishing between job ￿ ows and worker ￿ ows. However,
this detail is irrelevant for what concerns the calibration. With respect to the benchmark calibration of Pries
and Rogerson (2005), a version of the model without vacancy ￿xed-costs simply requires setting the vacancy
￿ ow cost to .298; all other parameters must remain unchanged to match the same stylized facts.
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workers are set to .5. These parameters are selected in order to preserve comparability with
Pries and Rogerson (2005) and with most of the literature in this ￿eld. The constant of the
matching function is set to .4 also in accordance with Pries and Rogerson (2005). Yet, as
pointed out by Shimer (2005), matching models of the labor market o⁄er a degree of freedom
in the choice of the constant of the matching function, as there exist in￿nite combinations
of that constant with the ￿ ow cost of a vacancy which leave the equilibrium of the labor
market unchanged.
The exogenous job destruction rate ￿ is set to :0085 as in Pries and Rogerson (2005),
implying a yearly job destruction rate of about 10%. As shown by Bertola and Rogerson
(1996), the yearly job destruction rate is about 10% both for Italy - and more in general for
most European countries - and for the US. The value for the cost of a vacancy is set to .249,
in order to match an unemployment rate of 11.3%, as in Italy in 1997.
The value for the disutility of the working activity, b, is normalized to 1, implying that
bad matches are severed at equilibrium. It is easy to show that in this setting an increase
in the unemployment bene￿ts, or in the value of leisure is equivalent to an increase in b
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). If interpreted only as unemployment compensation, this
value for b implies a replacement ratio with respect to the average wage of about 58%. Se-
lecting an appropriate value for the replacement ratio is often controversial, since b includes,
besides unemployment bene￿ts, also non measurable entities such as the disutility and the
opportunity cost of the working activity. In the literature, values for the replacement ratio
in the US have been used, which range from 40% (Shimer, 2005) to 98.8% (Hagedorn and
Manovskii, 2007). Costain and Reiter (2008) argue that an intermediate value of about 75%
is more appropriate and consistent with the estimated elasticity of the unemployment rate
to unemployment bene￿ts for the OECD countries. As shown by Table 2.4 in the Appendix,
Italy is characterized by a very low level of unemployment bene￿ts. A somewhat lower value
of 58% for Italy might therefore be appropriate. Moreover, changes in the value of b show
that the normalization in the benchmark parametrization is not essential for the quantitative
conclusions.
The level of ￿ring costs, d, is set to equal three months of the average wage observed in
the equilibrium. Although there are no direct estimates for administrative costs of dismissal,
this value for d is often used to represent an average European country. Three months is a
conservative choice in this framework since the higher the level of ￿ring costs, the stronger
the quantitative impact of temporary contracts. The values for the dismissal cost used in
the literature to represent a Mediterranean country range from six weeks (Nagypal, 2002),
to six months (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001), or even one year and a half (Blanchard and
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Landier, 2002).
In Italy, a set of minimum wages is determined in sectorial collective arrangements, and is
then extended to all employers who were not parties to the original agreement. Therefore, as
opposed to other countries in Europe, there does not exist a single minimum wage. Dolado et
al. (1996) report values of the Kaitz index for many OECD countries. This index measures
the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage, weighted by the fraction of workers
covered by the agreements, and it is used in this calibration to pin down a value for ￿ !. As
it is possible to see from Table 2.4 in the Appendix, the Kaitz index measured for Italy is
higher than for other OECD countries. Finally, the last parameter to set in the calibration,
the value of ￿; is targeted to match a share of temporary contracts equal to 7.5%, as in Italy,
prior to the reforms of 1997.
2.5.2 Quantitative analysis
The benchmark economy:
I begin this section by judging how well the model in the benchmark parametrization
performs along some important dimensions which are not a direct target of the calibration
exercise. A crucial statistic to appraise the performance of the model is the transition
rate from temporary contracts into permanent contracts. The hypothesis that ￿rms use
temporary contracts as instruments of churning policies was indeed criticized for implying
excessively low transformation rates. On the other hand, excessively high transformation
rates might shed doubts on the assumption that Europe and US share the same learning
technology.
The model was therefore simulated generating 100 repetitions of 100000 employment-
unemployment paths for a worker starting in a temporary job. It was found that a temporary
worker has a probability of 41:3% to be employed in a permanent contract one year later.7
The 95% con￿dence interval around the mean ranges from 41% to 41.65%. Calculations
reported by the (OECD, 2002), based on the European Community Household Panel show
that exactly 41.3% of temporary workers in Italy in 1996 had moved into permanent job
positions one year later. For most European countries the same transition probabilities
range from about 36% to 56%, with only two notable exceptions: Spain, 23:1% and France,
20:8%: Such a low degree of upward mobility in these two countries looks like an exception in
the European scenario and suggests that alternative forces leading to market segmentations
could be dominant.
The contact ￿nding rate for a worker in the model economy is .47 per month. This
7See footnote 2.
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Benchmark Post-Reforms
￿ 0:278 0:744
eT=(eT + eP) 0:075 0:13
￿ ￿T 0:16 0:20
￿ ￿0 0:44 0:51
1 ￿ H(￿ ￿T) 0:62 0:54
1 ￿ H(￿ ￿0) 0:17 0:11
Wage gap 0:21 0:21
Productivity gap 0:27 0:29
Productivity change 0 0:02
Annual worker turnover (%) 50 62
Contact ￿nding rate 0:47 0:60
Unemployment rate 0:113 0:069
Output 1:63 1:70
Output change (%) 0 4:2
Table 2.2: Simulated results for the labor market reforms in Italy
value is close to the monthly job ￿nding rate of .48 measured by Hall (2005) for the US.
However, in this framework, the job ￿nding rate does not depend uniquely on the contact
￿nding rate, but also on the average probability of passing the hiring test. At the calibrated
equilibrium, the acceptance rates for temporary and permanent positions is .62 and .17,
respectively. As expected, the absence of dismissal costs for temporary contracts increases
the willingness of the ￿rms to experiment new workers, lowering the threshold value of
expected productivity required for hiring. The job ￿nding rate is .14 at equilibrium, implying
an average unemployment duration of 7.3 months.
Since hiring practices are less selective for workers employed on temporary positions,
temporary workers are on average less productive than permanent workers, and earn lower
wages. The wage gap implied by the calibration is about 21%, and re￿ ects a productivity
gap of about 27%. The OECD (2002) reports that in 1997 the wage penalty for temporary
workers in Italy was about 28%. Controlling for worker and job characteristics, the wage
penalty decreases to 13% in Italy, and is ranging between 6% and 24% in Europe, with an
average value of 15%. The wage gap implied by the model seems somewhat larger than in
the data.
The performance of the model is also consistent with evidence on the dynamic relative
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wage pro￿le for temporary and permanent workers. Having assumed that heterogeneity is
only match speci￿c implies that any temporary worker will sooner or later be employed in a
high productivity permanent match. Consequently, temporary workers are expected to catch
up completely with the wages earned by workers on permanent positions. This is consistent
with the results of Booth et al. (2002) in a study on the British labor market. They ￿nd that
the wage gap between workers who start working on temporary and permanent contracts
substantially tapers o⁄ with full-time work experience. In particular, women who start in
￿xed-term employment and move to permanent jobs are found to fully catch up to those
who start in permanent jobs.
Following the standard practice, I compute the gross annual worker turnover rate by
multiplying the monthly turnover rate by 12. The monthly turnover rate is in turn computed
as the sum of employment entry and exit rates, where a transition from a temporary to a
permanent position is recorded as a simultaneous entry and exit. The gross annual worker
turnover rate implied by the model is about 50 percent. In the data, Contini (2006) ￿nd
a turnover rate of about 62 percent in Italy, for the period 1986-1999. If transitions from
temporary to permanent contracts are not recorded, the turnover rate implied by the model
is about 42 percent. Accounting for these types of transitions can therefore improve the ￿t
of the model, which is able overall to capture a large fraction of the measured turnover rate.
Comparative statics:
I now turn to evaluate how well the model is able to replicate the performance of the
Italian labor market in the last decade following the reforms of temporary contracts. As
it is possible to see from Figure 1 in the Appendix, the unemployment rate decreased, in
these ten years, from 11.3% in 1996 to 6.8% in 2006, while the share of temporary contracts
increased over the same period from 7.5% to 13%. A simple exercise of comparative statics is
then performed, in which the strictness of the regulation on temporary contracts is reduced
in order to match a share of 13% in the total stock of contracts. The results of this exercise
are summarized in Table 2.2.
The exercise is particularly successful at reproducing the pattern of the unemployment
rate in Italy, which decreases to 6:9% following the reforms. The intuition for the decrease
in unemployment is straightforward. When the share of temporary contracts in the economy
is increased, screening workers on the job is less costly, on average, and more ￿rms enter
the market. A higher entry of ￿rms together with a higher experimentation of workers in
temporary contracts both contribute to increase the rate of exit from unemployment. In
turn, this decreases both the rate and the duration of unemployment.
The exercise also predicts an increase in productivity of about 2%. The intuition is
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as follows. An increase in the share of temporary contracts generates two opposite e⁄ects
on productivity. Since temporary workers are less productive than permanent workers, in-
creasing their share will tend to decrease average productivity. However, as the expected
cost of screening workers on the job decreases with the share of temporary workers, labor
market tightness increases, and the combined outside option of workers and ￿rms increases.
In turn, this reduces the surplus of a match and translates into a higher threshold value of
expected productivity required to form both temporary and permanent matches. This e⁄ect,
which leads to lower acceptance rates and higher productivity, is found to dominate at the
calibrated equilibrium, and proves robust to changes in the value of dismissal costs.
Given that total employment also increases at equilibrium, welfare, measured as total
output in the economy, increases by 4:2%. If we consider the lifetime discounted value of
search as an alternative measure of welfare, then welfare raises by 7:7%. This increase is
due to lower unemployment duration, which in turn is triggered by higher contact rates,
and by higher chances to pass the hiring test. Overall, the calibration clearly suggests that
welfare gains derived from using temporary contracts as a screening device might be large,
depending on ￿ring restrictions on permanent positions and on the length of probationary
periods. Given the process of learning about match quality estimated by Pries (2004), it
takes more than seven months, on average, to discover the productivity of a worker. The
probability that the true productivity of a match is still unknown after three months is
about 66%, and after six months about 43%. Without access to temporary contracts, trial
periods of three months, or six months, which are common across European countries, might
therefore be too short to allow for an e¢ cient reallocation of workers across existing jobs.
By generating a higher experimentation of workers in the economy, temporary contracts
lead to a higher turnover rate, which is close to 62% in the calibration. The reason is
that a higher share of temporary contracts increases both rejections of bad matches, and
transformations into permanent employment. Finally, while the productivity gap increases
by about 2%, the wage gap is not substantially a⁄ected by the reforms. The elasticity of
the wage gap with respect to the productivity gap is only 5% at the calibrated equilibrium.
The intuition is that the ￿rm-worker pair in a temporary match has an option value on a
permanent relationship which is exerted if the match turns out to be good. An increase in
the productivity of permanent workers, raising the surplus of a permanent match, will then
translate into an increase of the surplus of a temporary match. With Nash bargaining, both
wages will then increase.
The interactions of temporary contracts, dismissal costs, and the minimum wage:
The results indicate that so long as temporary contracts are used as a screening device,
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eT=(eT + eP) :075 :13
￿ ￿T 0:12 0:14
￿ ￿0 0:24 0:26
1 ￿ H(￿ ￿T) 0:71 0:67
1 ￿ H(￿ ￿0) 0:45 0:41
Wage gap (%) 0:15 0:16
Productivity gap 30:0 30:5
Productivity change 0 0
Annual worker turnover (%) 56:6 64:9
Contact ￿nding rate 0:29 0:30
Unemployment rate :113 :104
Output 1:61 1:62
Output change (%) 0 0:6
Table 2.3: Simulated results for a ￿ exible wage economy
their introduction in an economy with both ￿ring costs and a minimum wage can have strong
implications in terms of unemployment, productivity and welfare. In order to disentangle how
dismissal costs and the minimum wage interact with each other, and how the two together
in turn interact with temporary contracts, I calibrate, following the same procedure outlined
above, a version of the economy with ￿ exible wages. Next, I perform the same exercise of
comparative statics in order to assess how much the minimum wage matters when temporary
contracts are introduced in an economy with dismissal costs. The results are reported in
Table 2.3.
If ￿ exible wages are introduced in an economy otherwise identical to the one in the
benchmark parametrization, the unemployment rate drops to 6.7%. It is therefore clear that
the interaction of dismissal costs with the minimum wage has a strong negative e⁄ect on job
creation. The intuition is simple: with Nash bargaining, wages in the ￿rst period adjust in
order to equally split the burden of future ￿ring costs between the parties. If such a transfer
of resources from the worker to the ￿rm is prevented, the negative impact of ￿ring costs on
expected pro￿ts is larger, and thus entry is lower. In order to match an initial unemployment
rate of 11.3% in the model with ￿ exible wages, the vacancy cost must then be increased to
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1. Furthermore, ￿ must be set to 0.393 to match a share of temporary contracts of 7.5%
when all the other parameter values are left unchanged with respect to Table 2.1.
The strong increase in the vacancy posting cost with respect to the benchmark calibration
implies a lower contact ￿nding rate. Given that with a low contact rate the combined
outside option of both workers and ￿rms is lower, the threshold values for ￿ ￿T and ￿ ￿0 are also
lower, implying higher acceptance rates. When the share of temporary contracts is increased
to 13%, the impact on productivity is negligible, output increases by only 0.6%, and the
unemployment rate decreases by only 1%. With respect to the benchmark calibration, an
economy with ￿ exible wages can barely reproduce one ￿fth of the drop in the unemployment
rate. The interaction between ￿ring costs and the minimum wage is therefore crucial to
account for the behavior of the Italian labor market following the reforms. In general, it
seems that if temporary contracts are used as a screening device, labor market reforms
enhancing ￿ exibility at the margin can reverse most of the negative e⁄ects associated with
employment protection, and with its interaction with the minimum wage.
In the case in which d = 0, the minimum wage is not binding and does not a⁄ect the equi-
librium of the labor market. As ￿ring costs increase, the wage bargained in the ￿rst period
of a permanent relationship decreases, and the minimum wage eventually becomes binding.
Therefore, in the model economy, minimum wages have no direct e⁄ect on the equilibrium,
but only an indirect e⁄ect through the interaction with dismissal costs. Minimum wages
a⁄ect the economy to the extent that they set an upper bound on the transfer of resources
that can take place in the ￿rst period of a relationship. The higher the minimum wage, the
stronger the impact of temporary contracts. However, reasonable changes in the minimum
wage with respect to the value set in the benchmark calibration do not substantially a⁄ect
the quantitative result.
2.6 Discussion
Numerical solutions of the model show that the e⁄ects produced by the introduction of
temporary contracts hinge on labor market institutions. If screening workers for permanent
positions is the main reason why ￿rms use these types of contracts, liberalizing their use
increases productivity and welfare and decreases the unemployment rate so long as ￿ring
workers with permanent contracts is costly. In general, the higher the dismissal costs, the
higher the bene￿ts associated with a reduction of employment protection at the margin.
Moreover, the existence of a minimum wage strongly magni￿es the negative e⁄ects associated
with employment protection. Since the introduction of temporary contracts can reverse most
of these e⁄ects, their impact on the economy will therefore be stronger in connection with a
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strong minimum wage legislation.
These results were also obtained under the assumption that ￿ring costs are a pure re-
source waste. This is probably the most conventional way of modeling ￿ring costs, although
it is not unique. Alternatively, dismissal costs can be modeled as severance payments. In
this case ￿ring costs are simply a transfer of resources from the ￿rm to the employee in case
of dismissal. It is well-known that with ￿ exible wages, severance payments have no impact
on the labor market equilibrium since a transfer of resources conditional on a separation does
not a⁄ect the size of the surplus. With ￿ exible wages and severance payments, wages in the
￿rst period of a relationship adjust in order to fully compensate ￿rms for future expected
dismissal costs, without altering their incentives to enter the market. Yet, in the presence of
a minimum wage, this transfer cannot take place, entailing a negative e⁄ect on job creation.
The choice of modeling ￿ring costs as a pure waste of resources is therefore not essential for
the results.
It was noted that in the case in which d = 0, temporary contracts have no impact on
the labor market equilibrium. Obviously, if there are no ￿ring costs on permanent positions,
temporary contracts and permanent contracts are equivalent in this setting, and there are
no gains that can be obtained through screening workers for permanent positions. Thus, in
an economy with no ￿ring restrictions, such as the US, there is no reason why ￿rms should
resort to temporary contracts to screen workers. This can explain why temporary contracts
are found to be a port of entry into regular employment in Europe, but not in the US.
A common result in the literature on temporary contracts is that enhancing ￿ exibility
at the margin is a second best solution, the ￿rst best being a reduction in ￿ring costs. This
holds true also in this framework, as long as some waste of resources is associated with
￿ring permanent workers. Even in the case of ￿ = 1; when only good workers are hired for
permanent positions, the exogenous source of job destruction is still costly for the matched
worker-￿rm pair, and is therefore a source of welfare drain.
The mechanism highlighted in this paper reverses some of the conclusions obtained
through the standard models of temporary contracts, helping to reconcile the theory with the
empirical evidence. However, the main policy implications remain in line with the common
opinion expressed in the current debate. It cannot be excluded that some part of the work-
force, of debatable magnitude, might be harmed by the introduction of temporary contracts,
and remain trapped in recurring spells of temporary employment and unemployment. Sev-
eral economists have therefore proposed replacing various chategories of temporary contracts
with a unique permanent contract with extended probation. This view could be shared also
in the light of this paper, as all the gains that arise through temporary contracts could
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likewise be generated by extended probationary periods on permanent positions.
2.7 Conclusions
A growing body of empirical evidence has recently documented that in most European
countries, temporary contracts play a fundamental role in the labor market as a screening
device. For the case of Portugal, Varejao and Portugal (2003) show that screening workers
for permanent positions is the single most important reason why ￿rms use these types of
contracts. This paper presents a framework which embeds the screening hypothesis into
an equilibrium model of the labor market. The aim is to understand how temporary con-
tracts interact with other labor market institutions, and how they a⁄ect the labor market
equilibrium and welfare.
The model can account for the relatively high mobility rates into permanent employment
measured for most European countries, and for the recent empirical ￿ndings indicating that
temporary contracts correlate positively with employment at the European level. These re-
sults are important since models assuming that ￿rms use temporary contracts as instruments
of churning policies have opposite predictions. Models which assume that ￿rms use tempo-
rary contracts as bu⁄er stocks are instead inconclusive on the long-run e⁄ects on employment
and unemployment, and are unsuited to study the transition rates.
The paper also shows that when temporary contracts are used as a screening device,
they can substantially increase both productivity and welfare. Temporary contracts can
thus reverse most of the negative e⁄ects associated with employment protection, and with
its interactions with the minimum wage. The calibration of the model can account for
salient statistics of the Italian labor market, including the transition probabilities, the worker
turnover rate, the wage gap between temporary and permanent workers and the drop of the
unemployment rate, following the reforms.
The model presented in this paper isolates a single mechanism through which temporary
contracts generate welfare gains. However, this story captures only a part of the whole
picture. On the other hand, it is found that ￿rms o⁄er less training to temporary workers. By
a⁄ecting the expected duration of a relationship, temporary contracts might presumably also
in￿ uence workers￿investment in ￿rm-speci￿c human capital. It is possible that in European
labor markets, where systems of payment based on performance are scarce, employment
protection provides an alternative incentive to exert e⁄ort, and invest in ￿rm-speci￿c human
capital. Investigating how reductions of employment protection a⁄ect the pattern of human
capital accumulation, is beyond the scope of this paper, and remains an important question
to explore in future research.
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Unemployment Rate Share of Temporary Contracts
Figure 1: Share of Temporary Contracts and Unemployment Rate in Italy. 1996-2007
Country EPL Strictness Kaitz index Replacement ratio
United States 0.7 .39 .50
United Kingdom 0.9 .40 .38
Denmark 1.5 .54 .90
Finland 2.1 .52 .63
Sweden 2.6 .52 .80
Germany 2.6 .55 .63
France 2.8 .50 .57
Spain 3.1 .32 .70
Italy 3.4 .71 .20
Portugal 3.7 .45 .65
Table 2.4: Sources: OECD (1999,table 2.5, pp.62) and Dolado et al. (1996)
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LABOR MARKET VOLATILITY IN THE SEARCH AND
MATCHING MODEL: THE ROLE OF
INVESTMENT-SPECIFIC TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS
3.1 Introduction
1In the last few years, a large and active literature has emerged around the unemployment
volatility puzzle. More precisely, this literature assesses the extent to which the search-and-
matching model with Nash wage bargaining can account for the following three observations:
1) large ￿ uctuations in labor market variables relative to the ￿ uctuations of labor produc-
tivity; 2) low sensitivity of unemployment with respect to unemployment bene￿ts, and 3) a
high correlation between wages and productivity in new matches.
Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2008) have shown that the textbook version of
the Mortensen-Pissarides model is unable to generate the observed relative ￿ uctuations in
labor market variables in response to shocks to labor productivity. The failure of the model
is to be found in the surplus￿sharing rule implied by Nash bargaining. That is, wages
absorb most of the increases in labor productivity, thus reducing the procyclicality of the
￿rm￿ s share of the surplus and so the incentive for vacancy creation. Costain and Reiter
(2008) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) note that a di⁄erent calibration of the model
can generate large ￿ uctuations in labor market variables. Indeed, with high, acyclical non-
market returns to workers and low workers￿bargaining power, wages become relatively rigid
and the ￿rm￿ s share of surplus more procyclical, restoring the ￿rm￿ s incentives to create
vacancies. However, as pointed out by Costain and Reiter (2008) and by Pissarides (2008),
this calibration strategy implies a counterfactually high sensitivity of unemployment to non-
market returns. A di⁄erent line of research has advocated for the replacement of continuous
Nash wage bargaining by some stickier sharing rule. Gertler and Trigari (2007), among
others, propose wage stickiness ￿ la Calvo. Hall (2005) argues in favor of e¢ cient wage
stickiness where wages do not react, or only partially, to high-frequency changes in labor
productivity.2 Objections to models with sticky wages have been raised by Pissarides (2008)
1This paper is a joint work with my supervisor Salvador Ortigueira.
2Di⁄erent sources of wage rigidity in the search-and-matching model have been studied e.g. by Hall and
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and Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens (2008) by arguing that they fail to generate the high
correlation between wages and productivity observed in new matches.
In this paper, we retain the assumption of continuous Nash renegotiation of wages and
contribute to this literature by endogenizing labor productivity to the ￿rm￿ s investment and
hiring policy. With this aim, we remove the assumption of employer-worker pairs producing
without capital and assume instead the standard neoclassical ￿rm that employs many workers
and owns capital.3 We then explore the ability of the model to amplify the volatility of labor
market variables after shocks to both neutral and investment-speci￿c technology. We model
this latter type of technology as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997, 2000) which
allows us to calibrate investment-speci￿c technology shocks using the cyclical component of
the relative price of new capital goods. In our model economy, job separations within the ￿rm
occur exogenously and capital depreciates at a constant rate. To hire workers the ￿rm must
open vacancies and then negotiate wages for new and continuing workers. Adjusting the level
of capital and employment is costly and these costs are jointly determined by investment
and hiring rates. An important consequence of the large ￿rm assumption is the so-called
intra-￿rm bargaining, that is, the fact that the ￿rm anticipates the wage e⁄ects of its hiring
and investment policy.4 By virtue of intra-￿rm bargaining, the wage function in our model
becomes increasing in the level of neutral technology and decreasing in investment-speci￿c
technology.
In our calibrated economy, shocks to investment-speci￿c technology account for 40 per-
cent of the observed volatility in U.S. labor productivity. Moreover, these shocks generate
relative volatilities in vacancies and the workers￿job ￿nding rate which match those observed
in U.S. data. Relative volatilities in unemployment and labor market tightness are 55 and
75 percent of their empirical values, respectively. In other words, from this quantitative
exercise we conclude that 40% of the volatility in labor productivity explains 22% of the
observed volatility in unemployment, 40% of the volatility in vacancies, 30% of the volatility
in tightness and 40% of the volatility in the job ￿nding rate. These numbers are about one
order of magnitude higher than those obtained by Shimer (2005) within the textbook version
of the Mortensen-Pissarides model.
The mechanism for ampli￿cation in our economy works through the costly adjustment of
capital and labor and its e⁄ect on the intra-￿rm bargained wage. There are two main forces
shaping the response of vacancies to investment-speci￿c technology shocks. In the ￿rst place,
Milgrom (2008), Kennan (2006), Menzio (2005), Moen and Rosen (2006) and Rudanko (2008).
3For early work on the search-and-matching model with large ￿rms see Andolfato (1996) and Merz (1995).
4See Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b) for a general discussion of intra-￿rm bargaining. For studies of
intra-￿rm bargaining within the search-and-matching model see, e.g., Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), Krause
and Lubik (2007) and Rotemberg (2006).
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the ￿rm needs to spread out the convex adjustment costs over time, which creates a tension
between investment and hiring leading to a contraction in hiring. The second force comes
from the compressing e⁄ect of these shocks on wages, which increases the procyclicality of
the ￿rm￿ s share of the surplus with respect to these shocks and leads to an increase in hiring.
We will elaborate further on this in the main text of this paper.
The increased volatility in labor market variables in our model economy is not at the cost
of a counterfactually high sensitivity of unemployment to unemployment bene￿ts. Since we
calibrate the model to match a replacement rate of 45 percent, non-market returns are low
compared to returns from employment. In our benchmark economy, the semi-elasticity of
unemployment with respect to bene￿ts is slightly above one, which is in the lower bound of
estimated values. On the other hand, the correlation between wages and labor productivity
in our economy with investment-speci￿c technology shocks is 0:9, a value which is in line
with the correlation estimated in new matches.
The way we introduce investment-speci￿c technological change in our model economy
closely follows the original idea of technology embedded in new investment goods, which
the ￿rm can acquire by devoting resources to investment. As in Greenwood, Hercowitz and
Krusell (1997, 2000), we allow the ￿rm to continuously invest in new capital, in contrast
to the Schumpeterian view where only newly created ￿rms have access to new technologies,
with all its implications in terms of employment reallocation. In this regard, the mecha-
nism we explore in this paper to generate volatility in labor market variables after shocks
to investment-speci￿c technology is di⁄erent from the ones put forward recently by Reiter
(2008), Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) and Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007). Re-
iter (2008) abstracts from capital and retains the assumption of employer-worker pairs. This
author models embodied technical change by assuming that the exogenous process for labor
productivity has a permanent match-speci￿c component. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante
(2007) introduce capital into the employer-worker pair but assume that ￿rms in an existing
match can never adjust their capital stock in response to a change in the environment. In
these two works, ampli￿cation in unemployment and vacancies is at the cost of an exces-
sive volatility in wages. Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) are interested on the e⁄ects of
neutral and investment-speci￿c technical change on job ￿ ows, especially on job destruction.
They assume that while newly created jobs embody the most advanced technologies, existing
jobs fail to upgrade their capital. They ￿nd that advances in investment-speci￿c technology
reduce job destruction.5
5Other papers with investment-speci￿c technology shocks are Silva and Toledo (2007) and De Bock (2007).
These authors assume that the output produced by a job within the ￿rm is independent of the number of
workers in the ￿rm. Their setting does not generate ampli￿cation in labor market variables in response to
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Finally, the work of Elsby and Michaels (2008) and Yashiv (2008) also use the assumption
of large ￿rms, but they abstract from capital and from investment-speci￿c technology. These
authors study labor market volatility by introducing idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out our search-
and-matching model with large ￿rms, we de￿ne the search equilibrium and derive the wage
function for the parameterized economy. In Section 3 we carry out our quantitative analysis
and assess the ampli￿cation of unemployment, vacancies, tightness and the job ￿nding rate
after shocks to neutral and investment-speci￿c technology. This Section also addresses the
sensitivity of unemployment to unemployment bene￿ts and Section 4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The labor market
There is a measure one of identical, risk-neutral workers and an equal measure of ￿rms.
Unemployed workers search for jobs and ￿rms open vacancies in a frictional labor mar-
ket. The total number of matches per period, M, is given by an increasing, concave and
homogeneous-of-degree-one matching function,
M = M(V;1 ￿ N);
where V denotes the total number of vacancies created by all ￿rms and 1￿N is the number
of unemployed workers.
The vacancy matching rate, ￿, is thus given by M=V , and the job-￿nding rate of an
unemployed worker is M=(1￿N) = ￿￿, where ￿ denotes labor market tightness V=(1￿N).
3.2.2 Firms
The production sector is described by a measure one of value-maximizing ￿rms facing
an in￿nite time horizon. Firms produce an identical, aggregate good with a production
technology given by F(z;k;n), where k denotes capital, n is the ￿rm￿ s level of employment
and z is the level of neutral technology. Function F is assumed to be increasing, jointly
concave and linearly homogeneous in capital and labor. Firms own the capital stock and
thus both capital and labor are predetermined variables.
In a given period, the ￿rm loses employment at the exogenous, stochastic rate ￿, whose
evolution is speci￿ed below, and it opens vacancies to hire new workers. Newly hired workers
start producing in the next period. Firms expect vacancies to be matched with workers at
investment-speci￿c shocks.
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the rate ￿(S), where S denotes the vector of aggregate state variables [we will use ￿small"
s to denote the vector of ￿rm-level state variables]. The cost to the ￿rm of advertising v
vacancies is given by the convex function C(v). The evolution of employment within the
￿rm is given by,
n
0 = ￿(S)v + (1 ￿ ￿)n: (3.1)
The stock of capital depreciates at the constant rate ￿. The assumption of investment-
speci￿c technical change implies that one unit of the aggregate good invested in capital
increases its stock by q units. That is, the evolution of capital is,
k
0 = iq + (1 ￿ ￿)k; (3.2)
where i denotes gross investment. Thus, factor q represents the level of investment-speci￿c
technology, which is assumed to follow an exogenous, stochastic process. This particular
modeling was ￿rst used by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997, 2000) in order to assess
the role of investment-speci￿c technical change in generating both postwar U.S. growth and
U.S. aggregate ￿ uctuations. Since 1=q is the relative price of capital, we will use de-trended
price series to derive the volatility and persistence of the technology process q.
Accommodating ￿v new workers and iq units of new capital within the ￿rm is costly. We
assume that adjustment costs of labor and capital interact and represent total adjustment
costs by the function H(v;i;s;S), where s = (z;q;￿;k;n) and S = (z;q;￿;K;N) are the
vectors of individual and aggregate state variables, respectively. Function H is convex with
Hv > 0, Hi > 0, Hk < 0 and Hn < 0, for k > 0 and n > 0. The assumption of interrelation
between labor and capital adjustment costs implies that Hkn 6= 0. We will provide evidence
supporting assumption below.
The ￿rm￿ s objective is the maximization of the present value of cash ￿ ows. First, the
￿rm opens vacancies and invests in capital. Next, wages for new hires and existing workers
are negotiated.6 The standard Nash-bargaining solution is assumed. Since the ￿rm is large
￿ i.e. it employs a mass of workers￿ negotiated wages will depend on the ￿rm￿ s hiring and
investment policy. Intra-￿rm bargaining implies that the ￿rm anticipates the wage e⁄ects
of its policy. Thus, if we denote by !(v;i;s;S) the wage function that solves the wage
bargaining problem of a ￿rm that opened v vacancies and invested i in new capital, at
6This timing for investment is not relevant for our results. We carried out the analysis assuming that
investment is decided upon simultaneously with wage negotiations and found no signi￿cant di⁄erences.
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individual and aggregate states s and S, then the maximization problem of the ￿rm is,
￿(s;S) = max
v;i




equations : (3:1) and (3:2)
lnz
0 = ￿z lnz + ￿z (3.3)
lnq
0 = ￿q lnq + ￿q (3.4)
ln￿
0 = (1 ￿ ￿￿)ln ^ ￿ + ￿￿ ln￿ + ￿￿ (3.5)
(￿z;￿q;￿￿)
T ￿ N(0;D); where D is a diagonal matrix, (3.6)
where ￿(s;S) is the value of the ￿rm and where aggregate state variables are expected to
evolve according to some function of the current levels. The ￿rm discounts future cash
￿ ows at the rate ￿, which is the same rate risk-neutral workers use to discount income.
Parameters ￿z and ￿q denote persistence of the neutral and investment-speci￿c technology
processes, respectively; ^ ￿ and ￿￿ denote the average and the persistence of the job separation
rate, respectively. Vector (￿z;￿q;￿￿)T denotes the respective innovations with variance matrix
D.
It should be noted that the concavity of the production function and the convexity of
the adjustment cost and vacancy cost functions do not guarantee the concavity of the ￿rm￿ s
maximization problem. Since the ￿rm foresees the wage function that will solve the Nash-
bargaining problem with the workers, the maximization problem may be non-concave. We
will argue below that in our benchmark economy ￿rst-order conditions are necessary and
su¢ cient.
The ￿rst-order condition to vacancies can be written as,
!vn + Cv + Hv = ￿￿E￿
0
n; (3.7)
where function arguments have been omitted as there is no risk of ambiguity. !v denotes the
derivative of !(v;i;s;S) with respect to vacancies; Cv is the derivative of the vacancy cost
function; Hv is the derivate of the adjustment cost function with respect to v, and ￿0
n is the
derivative of the value function with respect to employment, evaluated at next-period values.
The term !vn on the left-hand side of (3:7) is a consequence of the assumption of large ￿rms
conducting intra-￿rm bargaining. The e⁄ect of vacancies on wages, via adjustment costs, is
internalized by the ￿rm when opening vacancies. That is, the ￿rm takes into account the
change in total wage costs, !vn, when determining its hiring policy.
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The ￿rst-order condition to investment is given by,
!in + 1 + Hi = q￿E￿
0
k: (3.8)
As with vacancies, the ￿rm also weighs the e⁄ect of investment on total wage costs, !in,
when setting the level of investment. From the envelope condition, the value of capital for
the ￿rm, ￿k, satis￿es the following non-arbitrage condition,
￿k = Fk ￿ !kn ￿ Hk + (1 ￿ ￿)￿E￿
0
k; (3.9)
which also embeds the e⁄ect of capital on the cost of labor.
Finally, the net value of employment for the ￿rm, J ￿ ￿n, must satisfy the following
non-arbitrage condition,
J = Fn ￿ !nn ￿ ! ￿ Hn + (1 ￿ ￿)￿EJ
0; (3.10)
where Fn is the marginal productivity of labor and !nn captures the e⁄ect of employment
on the cost of labor.
3.2.3 Workers
Workers are risk-neutral and discount future consumption of the aggregate good at the
rate ￿. A worker earns a wage, !, if employed and receives income, b, if unemployed (this
income is interpreted as unemployment bene￿ts, home production or, more generally, as the
income value of leisure). The change in employment status depends on job creation and job
destruction. Each period, ￿n employed workers lose their job and ￿￿u of the unemployed are
matched with a vacancy. When negotiating wages, workers take matching probabilities as
given. Thus, denoting by W the worker￿ s net value of employment at the ￿rm, the following
non-arbitrage condition must hold,
W = ! ￿ b + ￿E
h
(1 ￿ ￿)W




where ^ W 0 is the expected value of employment outside the ￿rm in the following period.
(From our assumption of identical ￿rms it follows that W 0 = ^ W 0 in equilibrium.)
3.2.4 Wage bargaining
A ￿rm negotiates wages with each of its workers. The Nash-bargaining solution max-
imizes the weighted product of the worker￿ s and the ￿rm￿ s value of employment. We use
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The ￿rst-order condition to this maximization problem yields the standard sharing rule,
(1 ￿ ￿)W = ￿J: (3.13)
Combining the equation above with (3.7), (3.10) and (3:11), and using the assumption of
continuous wage renegotiation, we obtain
!(v;i;s;S) = ￿ [Fn(z;k;n) ￿ !n(v;i;s;S)n ￿ Hn(v;i;s;S)] + (1 ￿ ￿)
h





Equation (3.14) is a di⁄erential equation in the unknown wage function !(v;i;s;S). This
equation embeds two important departures from the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model,
where the production side is made up of employer-worker pairs (small ￿rms) without capital.
In our setting, the ￿rm￿ s ￿ ow value of the match is not solely pinned down by the marginal
productivity of the worker. Here, the ￿rm also takes into account the value of the worker￿ s
contribution to decreasing wages (the second term within the ￿rst brackets) as well as total
adjustment costs (the third term within ￿rst brackets). Since new hires, ￿v, and new capital,
iq, interact in the determination of total adjustment costs, the wage function also depends
on the level of investment-speci￿c technology q.
3.2.5 Equilibrium
A recursive search equilibrium with intra-￿rm bargaining can be loosely de￿ned by
decisions rules for vacancies and investment, a wage function !(v;i;s;S), a vacancy matching
rate ￿(S), labor market tightness ￿(S), value functions and laws of motion for aggregate state
variables such that:
i) Decision rules for vacancies and investment solve the ￿rm￿ s maximization problem,
given the wage function, the vacancy matching rate and the laws of motion for aggregate
variables.
ii) The wage function is the solution to the Nash-bargaining problem (3:14).
iii) Matching rates are given by the matching function evaluated at V = v and N = n.
iv) Laws of motion for the aggregate states are consistent with individual behavior.
v) Value functions solve the ￿rms￿and workers￿maximization problems.
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3.2.6 The Wage Function in the Parameterized Economy
Functional forms for production, matching, adjustment costs and vacancy creation costs
are now established. All of our functional forms are standard.
The production technology of the representative ￿rm is represented by a Cobb-Douglas
function with constant returns to scale in capital and labor,
F (z;k;n) = zAk
￿n
1￿￿; (3.15)
where A > 0 and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 are parameters.
The matching technology is represented by a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas
function, which is the standard functional form in the literature of frictional labor markets,
M(V;1 ￿ N) = MV
1￿￿(1 ￿ N)
￿; (3.16)
where M > 0 is the matching-e¢ ciency parameter and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 is the elasticitiy of matches
with respect to unemployment.








for n > 0 and k > 0 (3.17)
and
H(￿v;iq;n;k) = 0 for n = 0 or k = 0; (3.18)
where a1 > 0 and a2 > 0 are parameters. This adjustment cost function is a particular case
of one recently estimated by Merz and Yashiv (2007). As explained above, an important
feature of this function is the interaction between employment and investment rates in the
determination of total adjustment costs, which is captured by the last term in equation
(3:17). Merz and Yashiv (2007) ￿nd that this interaction term is key in accounting for
the market value of U.S. ￿rms. Further support for this interaction can be found in the
empirical literature on employment and capital adjustment decisions [see, i.e., Sakellaris
(2004), Letterie, Pfann and Polder (2004) and Contreras (2006a, 2006b).] For example,
Contreras (2006a) ￿nds, using data from the Colombian Annual Census of Manufacturing,
that it is more costly for the ￿rm to adjust capital and employment at the same time rather
than sequently. Indirect evidence can also be found in the work of Letterie, Pfann and Polder
(2004) who analyze data on Dutch plants in the manufacturing sector and ￿nd that only
20% of the positive employment spikes occur in the same period as an investment spike.
We show in this paper that the interaction between labor and capital in the adjustment
cost function is also key to generate volatility in labor market variables.
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Finally, the cost of opening vacancies is assumed to be linear in the number of vacancies,
C(v) = cv, where c > 0 is a parameter.
For this parameterization, the wage function that solves the Nash-bargaining problem
￿ di⁄erential equation (3:14)￿ can be found analytically. The next proposition presents the
general solution to the di⁄erential equation.
Proposition 3.1 The general solution to the di⁄erential equation characterizing the sym-
metric Nash-bargaining problem is given by,





















where   is an arbitrary constant.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We will impose   = 0 to focus our attention on the particular solution yielding a wage
bill equal to zero at n = 0. Further, we will also make sure that the bargaining set is non-
empty and wages are bounded along the equilibrium path of our baseline economy. The
last term within brackets in equation (3:19) is the worker￿ s value of unemployment which, in
equilibrium, is given by b+￿[!vn+Cv+Hv]. It should be noted that all the derivatives of the
wage function assume the worker￿ s reservation value as given and independent of ￿rm-level
variables.
It is apparent from a simple inspection of the wage function in (3:19) that the levels of
neutral and investment-speci￿c technology a⁄ect wages di⁄erently. On one hand, neutral
technology, z, has a positive, direct e⁄ect on wages, which leads to a perfect, positive corre-
lation between labor productivity and wages. As discussed in Shimer (2005), it is the perfect
correlation between productivity and wages generated by the Mortensen-Pissarides model
that lies at the heart of its failure to account for the observed volatilities in labor market
variables. On the other hand, investment-speci￿c technology, q, enters with a negative sign
in the wage function (notice that the ￿rm￿ s level of employment is bounded above by one,
and, therefore, ln(n) is a negative number). Thus, investment-speci￿c technology shocks
are bound to reduce the contemporaneous correlation between labor productivity and wages
and, as a consequence, to generate ampli￿cation in labor market ￿ uctuations.
The concavity of the ￿rm￿ s maximization problem for the parameterized economy can
now be assessed. Since the ￿rm foresees the wage function (3:19) when choosing its hiring
and investment policy, it is straightforward to show that the return function F(z;k;n) ￿
!(v;i;s;S)n￿i￿C(v)￿H(v;i;s;S) is concave in the controls but not in the state variables.
Indeed, the term ￿!(v;i;s;S)n is convex in n. This class of dynamic maximization problems
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have been studied in Skiba (1978) and Ladr￿n-de-Guevara, Ortigueira and Santos (1999),
and conditions for optimality have been established. In short, if parameter values are such
that there exists a unique, interior, saddle-path stable, steady-state equilibrium with real
roots, then ￿rst-order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient. This is the condition we will
check in our baseline economy below.
3.2.7 Parameter Values
We now assign values to all parameters of the model in order to assess the quantitative
e⁄ects of di⁄erent sources of volatility on labor market variables. Parameter values are set
so that the steady-state equilibrium of our baseline economy matches some key averages of
the 1951-2003 U.S. economy.
A time period in our model is set to one month. Values of the constant in the production
function, A, and of the bargaining power parameter, ￿, are set arbitrarily. We normalize
the value of A to one, and set ￿ equal to 1=2. The assumption of symmetric bargaining is
standard in the literature. The rate of job separation at the steady-state equilibrium is set
equal to 0:034, which corresponds to the probability that a worker loses his job within an
average month, as estimated by Abowd and Zelner (1985). The elasticity of matches with
respect to unemployment is set at 0:6, which is the midpoint value of the range estimated by
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). The value of the discount factor, ￿, is set to 0:995, which
yields a monthly interest rate of 0:5 percent. The depreciation rate of capital, ￿, is 0:011
and the value of ￿ in the production function is set at 0:3. The value chosen for ￿ yields a
yearly rate of depreciation of the order of 13 percent, which is the value for the depreciation
rate of equipment capital in the U.S. economy.
Income during unemployment b, the match-e¢ ciency parameter M, the marginal cost of
vacancy creation c, and the two parameters in the adjustment cost function a1 and a2 are
set so that the steady-state equilibrium of the model yields: i) A vacancy-￿lling rate of 0:9
per month. ii) Income during unemployment represents 45 percent of employment income.
This replacement rate is similar to the one chosen by Shimer (2005). iii) The total cost of
adjusting capital and labor represents 2:4 percent of output. This is the value estimated by
Merz and Yashiv (2007). iv) The sum of the marginal costs of adjusting capital and labor,
i.e., Hik + Hvn, amounts to 3:5 percent of output, also as estimated by Merz and Yashiv
(2007). v) Vacancy creation costs represent one percent of output.
It must be noted that our baseline economy has been pinned down without targeting
the unemployment rate and the workers￿job-￿nding rate. Yet, the values implied by the
baseline economy for these two variables are fairly close to U.S. average values. Thus, the
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steady-state equilibrium yields an unemployment rate of 6:2% and a job-￿nding rate of 0:5,
whereas U.S. average values for the period 1951-2003 are 5:7% and 0:45, respectively.
Our baseline economy is presented in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Baseline Economy
E¢ ciency of matching M 0:64
Matching-unemployment elasticity ￿ 0:6
Average job destruction rate ^ ￿ 0:034
Vacancy creation costs c 0:9
Parameter in adjustment cost function a1 180
Parameter in adjustment cost function a2 99
Workers￿bargaining power ￿ 0:5
Elasticity of output w.r.t. capital ￿ 0:30
Depreciation rate of capital ￿ 0:011
Discount factor ￿ 0:995
Unemployment bene￿ts b 1
We close this section by con￿rming that our baseline economy satis￿es the condition
for optimality stated above. A log linearization around the unique, interior, steady-state
equilibrium yields real eigenvalues, two of them lying outside the unit circle, which is the
condition for saddle-path stability in our model economy.
3.3 Model Evaluation
In this section we review a number of labor market stylized facts and then assess the
ability of our model to account for these facts. Tables 2 and 3 below present a selection of
business cycle statistics which have guided most of the recent research in the macro labor
literature. Standard deviations and correlations reported in these two tables are taken from
Shimer (2005) and Horstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) and correspond to the cyclical
components of logged variables detrended with a Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter with smoothing
parameter 105. Data consist of quarterly observations for the U.S. economy from 1951 to
2003.
The most salient features of ￿ uctuations in U.S. labor market variables are the large
volatilities of unemployment (u), vacancies (v), tightness (v=u) and the workers￿job-￿nding
rate (￿￿), relative to the volatility of labor productivity (y=n). As shown in the second
row of Table 2, unemployment ￿ uctuates 9:5 times more than labor productivity, vacancies
￿ uctuate 10 times more; ￿ uctuations in labor market tightness are almost 20 times larger
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than those in productivity and the job-￿nding rate ￿ uctuates almost 12 times more than
productivity. On the contrary, the volatility of wages is close to the volatility in labor
productivity. Another important feature of these data is the low-to-moderate correlation
between ￿ uctuations in labor market variables and ￿ uctuations in labor productivity (see
fourth row of Table 2). Unemployment is counter-cyclical with a correlation coe¢ cient of
￿0:408. Vacancies, tightness and the job-￿nding rate are pro-cyclical, with a coe¢ cient of
correlation of about 0:4. Wages are also pro-cyclical with a correlation of 0:65. In terms of
autocorrelation, all variables except wages have an autocorrelation coe¢ cient of about 0:9.
Wages have a ￿rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0:78.
Table 2. 1951-2003 Quarterly U.S. Labor Market
u v v=u ￿￿ ! y=n
Standard Deviation(%) 19:00 20:20 38:20 11:80 2:200 2:000
Std. Dev. relative to y=n 9:500 10:10 19:10 5:900 1:100 1
Auto-Correlation 0:936 0:940 0:941 0:908 0:781 0:878
Correlation with y=n ￿0:408 0:364 0:396 0:396 0:655 1
Notes. Standard Deviations and correlations in this table correspond to quarterly series,
detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter with smoothing parameter 105, as calculated by Shimer
(2005).
Cross correlations in ￿ uctuations of labor market variables are presented in Table 3 below.
It is worth noting the strong negative correlation between ￿ uctuations in unemployment and
vacancies of ￿0:89. This is the slope of the Beveridge curve.
Table 3. 1951-2003 Quarterly U.S. Labor Market
u v v=u ￿￿ y=n
u 1 ￿0:894 ￿0:971 ￿0:949 ￿0:408
v - 1 0:975 0:897 0:364
v=n - - 1 0:948 0:396
￿￿ - - - 1 0:396
y=n - - - - 1
Notes. Cross Correlations of detrended U.S. labor market variables.
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3.3.1 Labor Market Volatility in the Baseline Economy
In order to assess the ability of the model to amplify and propagate shocks, we adopt a
step-by-step strategy and introduce each of the shocks separately. We ￿rst consider neutral
technology shocks, i.e. shocks that a⁄ect the production of the consumption and investment
good equally. Secondly, we study the response of labor market variables to investment-
speci￿c shocks, i.e. to shocks that a⁄ect only the production of the capital good. Finally,
we combine these two shocks along with shocks to the rate of job destruction.
3.3.1.1 Neutral Technology Shocks
The standard approach used to assess the volatility properties of the Mortensen-Pissarides
model consists in assuming a reduced-form, stochastic, exogenous process for labor produc-
tivity and then deriving the implied ￿ uctuations in unemployment, vacancies, tightness, the
job-￿nding rate and wages. In our extended version of the model, however, labor produc-
tivity is endogenous to the ￿rm￿ s investment and hiring policies. Therefore, the obvious
counterpart for our model of the above approach is to shock labor productivity ￿ de￿ned
as output (net of adjustment and vacancy costs) per worker￿ by introducing neutral tech-
nology shocks, i.e., shocks to the technology to produce the aggregate good. In this section,
we carry out this exercise and calibrate the neutral technology process by following the tra-
ditional approach of the business cycle literature. As speci￿ed in equation (3:3), neutral
technology, z, follows the law of motion,
lnz
0 = ￿z lnz + ￿z; (3.20)
where ￿z ￿ N(0;￿￿z). We set ￿￿z equal to 0:0078 in order to match the quarterly standard
deviation of U.S. labor productivity of 2%. The persistence parameter, ￿z, is set equal to
0:95. In this section, the level of investment-speci￿c technology and the rate of job separation
are assumed to remain constant at their average values.
Our results, presented in Tables 4 and 5 below, are in accordance with those found by
Shimer (2005) within the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model with small ￿rms (employer-
worker pairs) and no capital. Shocks to the level of technology in the production of the
aggregate good fail to generate enough ampli￿cation in labor market variables. Neutral
technology shocks that generate the observed volatility in labor productivity of 2% account
for only 6% percent of the observed volatility in unemployment; for less than 12% percent of
the volatility in vacancies and for 9% of the volatility in tightness. The second row of Table
4 shows the generated volatilities in labor market variables relative to the volatility of labor
productivity. (Relative volatilities are the standard statistic reported in this literature to
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assess ampli￿cation.) Unemployment and the job-￿nding rate ￿ uctuate relatively less than
productivity. Vacancies and labor market tightness ￿ uctuate only 1:23 and 1:81 times more
than productivity, respectively. On the other hand, the relative volatility of wages is slightly
below that observed in U.S. data.
Shocks to neutral technology also fail to account for the moderate contemporaneous
correlation of labor market variables with labor productivity. In particular, labor market
tightness in the model is almost perfectly correlated with productivity, while this correlation
is only 0:4 in the data. The model has no propagation of neutral technology shocks.
The explanation for the model￿ s limited ampli￿cation of neutral technology shocks is to
be found, as in the framework of Shimer (2005), in the high sensitivity of wages to these
shocks. In our baseline economy, the contemporaneous correlation between labor produc-
tivity and wages is 0:998 (see fourth row of Table 4). As formulated by Shimer (2005), the
increase in wages after a positive technology shock absorbs most of the productivity increase
and therefore reduces the incentive for vacancy creation. Hence, equilibrium unemployment,
vacancies and the job-￿nding rate do no respond much to neutral technology shocks.
Table 4. Baseline Economy with Neutral Technology Shocks
u v v=u ￿￿ ! y=n
Standard Deviation(%) 1:307 2:478 3:634 1:450 1:929 2:000
Std. Dev. relative to y=n 0:653 1:239 1:815 0:725 0:964 1
Auto-Correlation 0:886 0:641 0:803 0:803 0:848 0:857
Correlation with y=n ￿0:940 0:899 0:952 0:952 0:998 1
Notes. Baseline economy with neutral technology shocks: Standard deviations and correlations in
this table correspond to detrended quarterly averages of the monthly generated series. A H-P
￿lter with smoothing parameter 105 has been used to obtain the trend.
As for cross correlations, the baseline economy succeeds at generating the strong corre-
lations between unemployment, vacancies, tightness and the job-￿nding rate observed in the
U.S. economy.
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Table 5. Baseline Economy with Neutral Technology Shocks
u v v=u ￿￿ y=n
u 1 ￿0:821 ￿0:920 ￿0:920 ￿0:940
v - 1 0:978 0:978 0:899
v=n - - 1 0:999 0:952
￿￿ - - - 1 0:952
y=n - - - - 1
Notes. Neutral Technology Shocks: Cross correlations of simulated variables.
We ￿nd it convenient to close this section by taking a further look at the high sensi-
tivity of wages to neutral technology shocks from the dynamics of the ￿rm￿ s ￿ ow value of
employment [the ￿rst expression within the brackets of equation (3:14)] and of the worker￿ s
value of unemployment [the second expression within the brackets of equation (3:14)]. Un-
der symmetric Nash-bargaining the wage is the average of these two values. Figure 1 below
shows the gross ￿ ow value of the match for the ￿rm (upper series) and the worker￿ s value
of unemployment (lower series) when the model is run for one thousand months. Cyclical
components of these values are not only strongly correlated (the correlation coe¢ cient is
0:9944) but show also a strong correlation with the level of neutral technology (the correla-
tion coe¢ cient between the ￿rm￿ s ￿ ow value of a match and z is 0:9902; and the coe¢ cient
for the workers￿value of unemployment and z is 0:9982:)
3.3.1.2 Investment-speci￿c Technology Shocks
We now study business cycle ￿ uctuations in labor market variables in the economy
with investment-speci￿c technology shocks and assess the ability of the model to generate
ampli￿cation. In this section, we shut down shocks to neutral technology and leave shocks
to investment-speci￿c technology as the only source of volatility. As explained above, the
volatility and persistence of the investment-speci￿c technology process can be estimated from
the capital price series (see Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000) and Fisher (2006) for
details). Thus, unlike neutral technology, whose volatility was set to match the observed
volatility in labor productivity, the calibration of investment-speci￿c technology is guided by
observed capital price series. Consequently, the question addressed in this section is twofold.
First, how much of the observed volatility in labor productivity can be explained by shocks to
investment-speci￿c technology? Second, do shocks to investment-speci￿c technology generate
the observed ampli￿cation in labor market variables? That is, does the model generate
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relative volatilities in unemployment, vacancies, tightness and the job-￿nding rate as those
observed in the U.S. economy?
The two parameters to be calibrated in the investment-speci￿c technology process,
lnq
0 = ￿q lnq + ￿q; (3.21)
are the volatility of ￿q and the persistence parameter ￿q. The volatility of shocks to investment-
speci￿c technology, ￿￿q, is set at 0:0095 in order to match the 2:6% quarterly standard devi-
ation of detrended capital prices of the U.S. economy. The baseline value for the persistence
parameter is set at 0:98. Capital prices show high persistence and we have carried out a
sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter. Our results are robust to changes in this
parameter.
The results of our exercise are shown in Tables 6 and 7 below. The answer to our
￿rst question is in the ￿rst row of Table 6: investment-speci￿c technology shocks yield
a volatility in labor productivity of 0:8%, thus accounting for 40% of its empirical value.
This number agrees with the estimated contribution of investment-speci￿c shocks to output
volatility found by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (2000) and Fisher (2006). These
authors use a standard neoclassical model with a Walrasian labor market and ￿nd that
shocks to investment-speci￿c technology explain about one third of U.S. output volatility.
Our question concerning the extent of labor market volatility generated by shocks to
investment-speci￿c technology is also addressed in Table 6. The volatility of unemployment
is 4:15%, which amounts to 22% of the volatility observed in the U.S. economy. The volatility
of vacancies is 8:09%, which is 40% of its observed value. As for labor market tightness and
the job-￿nding rate, generated volatilities represent 30% and 40% of the observed values,
respectively. The second row of Table 6 presents volatilities relative to the volatility of labor
productivity. Relative volatilities are close to the ones observed in U.S. data. For instance,
vacancies in our model economy ￿ uctuate 10:05 times more than labor productivity and
the job-￿nding rate ￿ uctuates 5:79 times more. In the U.S. economy these two numbers
are 10:1 and 5:9, respectively. Unemployment in the model ￿ uctuates 5:15 times more than
productivity, while this number is 9:5 in the U.S. economy. The relative volatility of labor
market tightness is 14:4, against 19:1 in the data. Finally, the model matches the observed
relative volatility of wages of 1:1.
Correlations of unemployment, vacancies, tightness and the job-￿nding rate with labor
productivity are also in line with the ones observed in U.S. data. In the model, the contem-
poraneous correlation coe¢ cient between unemployment and labor productivity is ￿0:42,
against a ￿0:4 in the data. For the other three variables, the model yields coe¢ cients of
around 0:48, against correlations of around 0:4 in the data.
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Table 6. Baseline Economy with Investment-speci￿c Technology Shocks
u v v=u ￿￿ ! y=n
Standard Deviation(%) 4:150 8:095 11:61 4:668 0:947 0:805
Std. Dev. relative to y=n 5:155 10:05 14:42 5:798 1:176 1
Auto-Correlation 0:854 0:564 0:754 0:753 0:767 0:978
Correlation with y=n ￿0:423 0:472 0:481 0:481 0:901 1
Notes. Baseline economy with investment-speci￿c technology shocks: Standard deviations and
correlations in this table correspond to detrended quarterly averages of the monthly generated
series. A H-P ￿lter with smoothing parameter 105 has been used to obtain the trend.
The explanation as to why investment-speci￿c technology shocks amplify the volatility of
labor market variables stems from adjustment costs and their impact on wages. We will make
use of the impulse-responses to a positive investment-speci￿c shock, shown in Figure 2, to
explain our results. Unlike shocks to neutral technology, investment-speci￿c shocks introduce
a bias in favor of capital by lowering its price. Hence, an increase in q yields an immediate
increase in investment with a consequent increase in adjustment costs. In order to spread
out these (convex) costs over time, the ￿rm￿ s optimal policy calls for a delay in the increase
of hiring after the increase in q. That is, the ￿rm ￿rst builds up the capital stock, taking
advantage of its lower price, and then increases employment. Indeed, both labor productivity
and vacancies are hump-shaped after an initial drop. [The drop in vacancies on impact to
the increase in technology is consistent with some empirical evidence using aggregate data
on hours worked. For recent work on the short-run e⁄ect of technology improvements on
hours worked see, i.e., Fisher (2006) and Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006).]7
These two variables ￿ productivity and vacancies￿show, after the initial drop, a pro-
longed increase before they start decreasing to their steady-state values (see Figure 2). The
delayed increase in hiring is fostered by the dampening e⁄ect of q on wages. Intra-￿rm
wage bargaining implies that the ￿rm shares adjustment costs with the workers and thus,
7It is also worth noting that the initial jump in investment and the drop in productivity at the time of the
increase in investment-speci￿c technology are consistent with both plant level and aggregate observations. For
instance, Sakellaris (1994) uses data on U.S. manufacturing plants from the Annual Survey of Manufactures
and studies plant productivity after factor adjustments. He ￿nds that Total Factor Productivity falls in
periods of investment spikes. His hypothesis for this fall is that the investment spike involves the introduction
in the plant of new technology embodied in the installed equipment, which may be operated ine¢ ciently
in the short run. In our model, the fall in productivity is due to the increased costs of adjusting the new
equipment. On the other hand, Hornstein and Krusell (1996) and Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) argue
that the mid-70￿ s productivity slowdown was caused by the increase in investment-speci￿c technology of the
mid 70￿ s. They point to adoption and learning as the main mechanisms for the productivity slowdown.
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investment-speci￿c technology shocks do not create a perfect correlation between labor pro-
ductivity and wages (see fourth row of Table 6). Even though this correlation coe¢ cient
is higher than its empirical value, 0:9 against 0:65, it represents a substantial decrease in
the sensitivity of wages to labor productivity, as compared to the case of neutral technology
shocks. Therefore, unemployment and vacancies respond relatively more to investment-
speci￿c shocks than they do to neutral shocks.
Furthermore, the model also does fairly well in accounting for the observed cross corre-
lations between labor market variables. The slope of the Beveridge curve is slightly below
the U.S. value. The model yields a contemporaneous correlation coe¢ cient between unem-
ployment and vacancies of ￿0:77, against a ￿0:89 in the data.
Table 7. Baseline Economy with Investment-speci￿c Technology Shocks
u v v=u ￿￿ y=n
u 1 ￿0:772 ￿0:896 ￿0:895 ￿0:423
v - 1 0:974 0:974 0:472
v=n - - 1 0:999 0:481
￿￿ - - - 1 0:481
y=n - - - - 1
Notes. Investment-speci￿c technology shocks: Cross correlations of simulated variables.
We close this section by showing the dynamics of the ￿rm￿ s and workers￿values determin-
ing the wage (see Figure 3 below). Unlike the case of neutral technology shocks, the cyclical
components of these two values are not perfectly correlated (the correlation coe¢ cient is
0:6375). Moreover, the correlation of the cyclical component of each of these values with
the level of investment-speci￿c technology is also substantially lower than under neutral-
technology shocks. Thus, the correlation coe¢ cient between the ￿rm￿ s ￿ ow value of a match
and q is 0:4696 and between the worker￿ s value of unemployment and q is only ￿0:1727.
This latter value implies a low feedback from the value of unemployment to the current
wage, contrary to what we observe in the economy with neutral-technology shocks.
3.3.1.3 Shocks to Neutral, Investment-speci￿c Technology and Job Separation
In this section we study labor market dynamics in the economy with three sources of
volatility: two technology shocks ￿ neutral and investment-speci￿c￿ and shocks to the rate
of job separation, ￿. Fluctuations in job separation in the U.S. economy are large and
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their contribution to labor market volatility has been widely acknowledged in the literature.
Fujita and Ramey (2008) estimate that contemporaneous ￿ uctuations in the separation rate
explain an important fraction of ￿ uctuations in U.S. unemployment.
The exercise we carry out in this section proceeds as follows. The exogenous process for
job separation, which we rewrite here for convenience, is,
ln￿
0 = (1 ￿ ￿￿)ln ^ ￿ + ￿￿ ln￿ + ￿￿; (3.22)
where ￿￿ ￿ N(0;￿￿￿). This is the process used by Ramey (2008) in Section 2.2 of his paper.
First, we calibrate the two parameters ￿￿ and ￿￿￿ in the job separation process so that
we match the persistence and volatility of job separation in the 1951-2003 U.S. economy.
For this period, the cyclical component of job separation yields a ￿rst-order autocorrelation
coe¢ cient of 0:733, and a volatility of 7:5% [see Shimer (2005)]. As for the investment-speci￿c
technology process we use the same calibration as in the previous subsection. Finally, we
recalibrate the volatility of the neutral technology shock so that the standard deviation of
labor productivity equals 2% in the model economy. That is, while the volatilities of the
innovations to ￿ and q are set to match the observed volatilities in job separation and in
capital prices, respectively, the volatility of innovations to z is chosen as the residual to match
the volatility of U.S. labor productivity. Following this procedure, the values obtained for
￿￿, ￿￿￿ and ￿￿z are 0:85, 0:043 and 0:007, respectively.
Tables 8 and 9 present volatilities and correlations of labor market variables in our base-
line economy with two technology shocks and a job separation shock. As shown in the ￿rst
row of Table 8, the model explains a substantial fraction of observed labor market volatility.
In particular, the model accounts for 43% of the observed volatility in unemployment, 78%
of the volatility in vacancies, 45% of the volatility in tightness and 61% of the volatility in
the job-￿nding rate. The volatility of wages in the model is 97% of its empirical value. The
model also accounts for the mild correlation between labor productivity and unemployment,
vacancies, tightness and the job-￿nding rate.
Table 8. Baseline Economy with Three Sources of Volatility
u v v=u ￿￿ ! y=n
Standard Deviation(%) 8:100 15:795 16:912 7:281 2:136 2:000
Std. Dev. relative to y=n 4:050 7:897 8:456 3:640 1:068 1
Auto-Correlation 0:764 0:346 0:536 0:519 0:654 0:874
Correlation with y=n ￿0:302 0:284 0:401 0:391 0:890 1
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Notes. Baseline economy with two technology shocks and a job separation shock: Standard
deviations and correlations in this table correspond to detrended quarterly averages of the
monthly generated series. A H-P ￿lter with smoothing parameter 105 has been used to obtain the
trend.
Cross correlations are presented in Table 9. As already shown by many authors ￿ e.g.
Cole and Rogerson (1999), Shimer (2005) and Ramey (2008)￿ shocks to the exogenous rate
of job separation generate a counterfactual upward-sloping Beveridge curve. In our model
economy this slope is 0:172. It should be noted that the positive unemployment-vacancy
correlation is not a result speci￿c to our model nor to the assumption of exogenous separation.
Ramey (2008) solves a version of the search-and-matching model with small ￿rms and shocks
to the exogenous rate of job separation and obtains a correlation between unemployment
and vacancies of 0:75. In a speci￿cation of his model with endogenous separation the value
for this correlation is as high as 0:92.
Table 9. Baseline Economy with Three Sources of Volatility
u v v=u ￿￿ y=n
u 1 0:172 ￿0:332 ￿0:304 ￿0:302
v - 1 0:879 0:880 0:284
v=n - - 1 0:991 0:401
￿￿ - - - 1 0:391
y=n - - - - 1
Notes. Baseline economy with two technology shocks and a job separation shock: Cross
correlations of simulated variables.
In light of the results in this paper and in some recent papers in this literature, it may
be said that the puzzle on labor market ￿ uctuations is more about correlations than about
volatilities. In other words, the question is not so much whether the search-and-matching
model generates ampli￿cation in labor market variables as whether it generates ampli￿cation
with the right correlations. A better understanding of the ￿ ow into unemployment seems to
be crucial to answer this latter question.
3.3.2 The Response of Unemployment to Labor Market Policy
We now turn to the sensitivity of unemployment with respect to unemployment bene￿ts.
As pointed out recently by Costain and Reiter (2008), the unemployment puzzle is not only
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about volatilities but also about the sensitivity of unemployment to policy, particularly to
unemployment bene￿ts. Besides citing a large body of empirical studies aimed at estimating
this sensitivity, these authors also conduct their own estimation using low-frequency cross-
country data from 1960 to 1999. They ￿nd that the long-run semi-elasticity of unemployment
with respect to bene￿ts ranges from 1.33 to 2.45, depending upon whether controls for
country or time e⁄ects are included or not.
In our benchmark economy, the long-run semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect




u, is equal to 1.1. This number is in the lower bound of empiri-
cal estimates, implying that in our calibration there is still room to increase unemployment
bene￿ts, which will allow us to generate even more volatility in labor market variables with
investment-speci￿c technology shocks, without creating an excessive sensitivity of unemploy-
ment to bene￿ts.
3.4 Conclusions
In the vast majority of the literature on search-and-matching models of the labor market,
production takes place in small ￿rms (employer-worker pairs) ￿ the Mortensen-Pissarides
model8. The productivity of the worker is assumed to follow an exogenous process and
capital is typically left out of the analysis. We depart from this framework by assuming large
￿rms, which invest in capital, create vacancies to hire new workers and pay adjustment costs.
We assume that wages are the outcome of a Nash-bargaining problem between the ￿rm and
the workers. Our main focus is on the business-cycle ￿ uctuations of labor market variables.
To this aim, we assume that the levels of neutral and investment-speci￿c technologies are
subject to shocks. A key feature of our model is that investment and hiring rates interact in
the determination of total adjustment costs. Empirical support for this interaction has been
recently o⁄ered by Merz and Yashiv (2007) using U.S. data.
While neutral technology shocks have only a small impact on labor market variables,
shocks to investment-speci￿c technology generate sizable ￿ uctuations in unemployment, va-
cancies, labor market tightness and the worker￿ s job ￿nding rate. In our economy, ￿ uctu-
ations in labor market variables are not associated with an implausible elasticity of unem-
ployment to unemployment bene￿ts.
By bringing the neoclassical ￿rm to the center stage of the search-and-matching model,
we show that volatility in labor market variables can be ampli￿ed without abandoning the
assumption of continuous Nash-wage bargaining. Even though the model we explored in
this paper is rather stylized, it allows us to gain new insights on the e⁄ect of investment-
8See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000).
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speci￿c technology shocks on labor market volatility. There are, however, many dimensions
along which the model can be extended and improved. The model, like many others in the
literature, fails to account for the strong, negative correlation between unemployment and
vacancies over the business cycle when job separation is non-constant.
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3.5 Appendix A:
Proof of the Proposition: Equation (3:14) is a linear, ￿rst-order di⁄erential equation and
its solution can be found analytically. Since the worker￿ s outside value is independent of the




[Fn ￿ !n(v;i;s;S)n ￿ Hn(v;i;s;S)]; (3.23)
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is the general solution to (3:14).
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Therefore, ^ ! is the solution to (3:24) if and only if,
^ !ne
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Multiplying through by dn and integrating, we get,

















where   is a constant of integration. For our parameterized economy, the integral in the
last term of (3:26) can be solved. First, e
R
(2=n)dn = e2ln(n) = n2. Then, using the functional















































After plugging the last two expressions back into (3:26) we obtain ^ !. Finally, adding the
worker￿ s reservation wage to this solution we obtain the wage function shown in Proposition
1 in the text.
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Figure 1: Firm￿ s ￿ ow value of a match (upper series) and worker￿ s value of unemployment
in our baseline economy under neutral technology shocks.
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Figure 2: Top chart plots the response of labor productivity (broken line) to a positive
shock to investment-speci￿c technology (solid line). Bottom chart plots the response of
investment (solid line) and vacancies (broken line).
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Figure 3: Firm￿ s ￿ ow value of a match (upper series) and worker￿ s value of unemployment
in our baseline economy under investment-speci￿c technology shocks.
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